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The last decade has seen the emergence of auction mechanisms for pricing and al-
locating goods on the Internet. A successful application area for auctions has been
sponsored search. Search firms like Google, Bing and Yahoo have shown stellar
revenue growths due to their ability to run large number of auctions in a com-
putationally efficient manner. The online advertisement market in the U.S. is es-
timated to be around $41 billion in 2010 and expected to grow to $50 billion by 2011
(http://www.marketingcharts.com/interactive/us-online-advertising-market-to-reach-
50b-in-2011-3128/). The paid search component is estimated to account for nearly
50% of online advertising spend.
This dissertation considers two problems in the sponsored search auction domain.
In sponsored search, the search operator solves a multi-unit allocation and pricing
problem with the specified bidder values and budgets. The advertisers, on the other
hand, regularly solve a bid determination problem for the different keywords, given
their budget and other business constraints. We develop a model for the auctioneer
that allows the bidders to place differing bids for different advertisement slots for
any keyword combination. Despite the increased complexity, our model is solved
in polynomial time. Next, we develop a column-generation procedure for large ad-
vertisers to bid optimally in the sponsored search auctions. Our focus is on solving
large-scale versions of the problem.
Multi-unit auctions have also found a number of applications in other areas that
include supply chain coordination, wireless spectrum allocation and transportation.
Current research in the multi-unit auction domain ignores the budget constraint
faced by participants. We address the computational issues faced by the auction-
eer when dealing with budget constraints in a multi-unit auction. We propose an
optimization model and solution approach to ensure that the allocation and prices
are in the core. We develop an algorithm to determine an allocation and Walrasian
equilibrium prices (when they exist) under additive bidder valuations where the
auctioneer’s goal is social welfare maximization and extend the approach to address
general package auctions. We, also, demonstrate the applicability of the Benders de-
composition technique to model and solve the revenue maximization problem from
an auctioneer’s standpoint.
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Auctions have been used since ancient times to price and allocate items. High value
art items and wholesale flower trade in Netherlands have used auctions for centuries.
In the last decade, the growth of the internet along with that in computational
power, has resulted in various auction forms gaining a great deal of prominence in
the business and academic community. Some of the biggest names in the e-commerce
domain, like eBay, Yahoo, Bing, Facebook and Google, are in fact large auction op-
erators. Auctions have also been used by various governments to sell public goods
like wireless spectrum, airport landing slots etc. Many traditional firms like Sears
and Home Depot [EK03] have successfully used auctions for procurements and have
observed significant savings. The growth in the usage of auctions in the industry
has spurred researchers in the academic community to study the same. Although
there have been many significant contributions made by the academic community
in studying the economic properties, bidding behavior and computational aspects of
the many auction formats, a majority of the studies ignore the presence of budget
constraints. Budget constraints are very important from the standpoint of both the
bidders participating in the auction process as well as the auctioneer and thus, in
this dissertation, we seek to address computational and modeling issues faced by
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bidders as well as the auctioneer, when faced with hard budget constraints. We fo-
cus largely on the sponsored search domain. This dissertation consists of four essays.
The first essay models the sponsored search problem that the search providers like
Google, Bing and Yahoo face. We develop more general sponsored search auction
mechanisms than currently used in practice. The second essay deals with model-
ing the sponsored search problem faced by the search advertiser bidding on various
sponsored search platforms. We develop a methodology that allows large advertisers
to optimally bid in sponsored search auctions. The third essay addresses computa-
tional issues in determining the outcome of an auction run by a revenue maximizing
auctioneer, where the bidders face a hard budget constraint and have additive val-
uations for the items. In the fourth essay, we model the auctioneer’s objective as
social surplus maximization while the bidder assumptions remain the same as in the
third essay. Here we wish to find a social welfare maximizing allocation along with
a set of stable prices.
1.1 Online Advertising & Sponsored Search
The growth in internet commerce and usage has affected the advertising indus-
try fundamentally. The last few years has been marked by the explosive growth
of companies like Google, Facebook and Yahoo, which while providing a host of
free services, derive their revenues primarily from online advertising. In fact, the
tremendous profitability of this medium has attracted the likes of Microsoft and
Ask to come up with their own advertising platform. From the perspective of the
advertisers, online advertising provides the best return on investment amongst all
alternatives as the advertiser has a much better idea about the end-user intent and
profile. Also, since the cost of advertising on the internet is much smaller than tele-
vision or print, search advertising provides a platform for small businesses, which
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earlier would have been priced out by larger firms from the advertising space, to
compete on an equal footing. This new form of advertising has affected traditional
advertising channels like Yellow Pages, since small, local advertisers can target the
same audience more effectively online.
Online advertising includes search advertising, referrals and lead generation ads,
banner ads, email ads, content related ads, social ads and rich media ads. The
most prominent of these formats is sponsored search advertising. Recent reports
on internet advertising estimate the revenues to be around $50 billion for 2011
(http://www.marketingcharts.com/interactive/us-online-advertising-market-to-reach-
50b-in-2011-3128/). Large advertisers on the internet include firms in domains such
as financial services, consumer electronics, retail, leisure, automotive and enter-
tainment. Search based advertising accounted for about 50% of the revenue while
display advertising, social media advertising, referrals and classifieds accounted for
a significant proportion of the rest. Although internet advertising has demonstrated
impressive growth rates in the last few years, the amount spent on it as a propor-
tion of the entire advertising budget is still less than 10 per cent. Growing usage
and penetration rates will push significant ad budgets from other mediums to the
internet. Also, the ability to dynamically determine suitable ads to display along
with better understanding of the user intent, based on textual or search keyword
analysis, makes the online ad market very attractive to firms using the internet for
commercial purposes.
GoTo (Overture Services), provided the first sponsored search platform on the inter-
net in 1998. Overture was later acquired by Yahoo and formed the basis for its ad
platform till the launch of its new platform, Panama, in 2007. Google modified the
Overture model by including click-thru rates for various keywords and introduced
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its system in 2002. In the last four years, Ask.com and Bing have also adapted a
model similar to that of Google, with modifications to account for demographic and
geographic targeting. All the search platforms mentioned above have the following
format - when a search user specifies a set of keywords to search for, the search
engines display algorithmic (organic) results. They also display a set of results,
clearly marked as advertisements, to the top or right of the screen. These text ads,
in response to the user query, are called sponsored search ads. The ad typically
consists of a title and a short description related to the business, along with the
business’s URL. The placement of the ad is determined differently by various search
engine operators. These ads also follow the pay-per-click (PPC) model. In the PPC
framework, the advertiser has to pay Google, Bing or Yahoo only if the search user
clicks on the respective ad. The payment rules for the advertiser’s also varies with
the search platform. Most of the popular platforms use a next−price payment rule
in which the advertiser pays an amount related to the bid of the advertiser posi-
tioned immediately below her. Also, one should note that all the above allocations
and price determinations are performed under budget constraints. Hence, the prob-
lem that Google and others seek to solve is one of expected revenue maximization
such that the budget constraints of bidders are not violated. On the other hand,
the bidders have to determine their bids, knowing that they have an explicit budget
constraint. Thus, unlike standard auction literature, where budget constraints are
rarely discussed, any study related to the sponsored search domain has to explicitly
account for the budget constraint. The presence of the budget constraint, however,
significantly increases the computational complexity of the problem and also, re-
sults in incentive issues that cannot be addressed by extending results from auction
models for the unconstrained problem.
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1.2 Literature Review
The last six years have seen a number of papers being published that specifically
deal with the problem of sponsored search. Feng et.al. [FBP07] discuss the vari-
ous sponsored search allocation mechanisms, specifically that of Google and Yahoo
(Overture). They use simulations to compare the revenues on various platforms
under different ranking schemes. Parkes & Sandholm [PS05] discuss the significant
limitations in the bidding language being used on various ad platforms. They em-
phasize the need for an expressive bidding language for the sponsored search domain
and detail the benefits that search providers and advertisers can obtain by having
this additional expressiveness. The paper provides a framework to deal with com-
putational issues for auctions that have greater expressiveness. Goodman [Goo05]
deals with one of the significant issues faced by the sponsored search domain, namely
click fraud. The author describes a pay-per-percentage of impressions model, instead
of the current pay-per-click model, to make the ad system immune from click and
impression fraud. Edelman & Ostrovksy [EO05] empirically show that bidders dis-
play strategic behavior for keyword combinations and that the strategic behavior
persists over time. Animesh et. al. [ARV05] investigate the difference in search
behavior observed in the sponsored search domain depending on the type of good
being sold. They classify the goods as experience or credence goods and determine
some of the drivers for this difference in behavior. Jansen & Resnick [JR05] investi-
gate the interaction between the organic and sponsored search term on the buying
behavior of a search user.
Mehta et.al. [MSVV07] address the budget constrained issue in search auctions and
provide an algorithm to maximize the auctioneer’s revenue. They use an online
bi-partite matching algorithm along with a trade-off revealing Linear Program(LP)
that takes into account the bid as well as remaining budget for each advertiser.
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Edelman et.al. [EOM07] and Varian [Var07] independently show that the current
next price auctions being used by Google and Yahoo are not incentive compatible,
contrary to what intuition may suggest. Aggarwal et.al. [AGM06] address the issue
of non-incentive compatibility in current sponsored search auctions and describe
a method to convert these auctions into truthful auctions. Andelman & Mansour
[AM04] formulate a multi-unit allocation problem with budget constraints and dis-
cuss an approximation method for solving the problem. However, their formulation
doesn’t properly model the sponsored search problem. The paper models a one-shot
allocation and pricing problem where bidders have additive valuations and face hard
budget constraints. In the sponsored search problem, however, the budget varies
over the various rounds and the participants and items being auctioned off also do
not remain the same in the multiple rounds. Borgs et.al. [BCI+05] demonstrate the
lack of incentive compatibility in auctions with budget constraints.
Zhou & Lukose [ZR06] show that equilibrium behavior in sponsored search auctions
is vulnerable to vindictive bidding. Iyengar & Kumar [IA06] present a general model
for the pay-per-click auction where the advertisers have multi-dimensional private
valuations per click. They characterize the set of incentive compatible and individ-
ually rational allocation rules. Liu et.al. [LJA06] discuss a class of auctions called
the weighted price auctions and its relation to the sponsored search problem. They
also analyze the equilibrium bidding strategy for this class of auctions. Asdemir
[Asd06] conducts an empirical study to identify bidding patterns observed online
and develops a one shot simultaneous move and an infinite horizon alternative move
game to model the observed patterns.
Although the sponsored search problem from the search engine’s perspective has
been relatively well studied, the problem faced by the advertiser has very limited
6
literature. Kitts & Leblanc [KL04] formulate the general problem that the advertiser
faces and discuss some methods used in the industry to estimate the system param-
eters. Ruschmevicheintong & Williamson [RW06] model the advertisers problem
when the number of slots available is just one. They discuss the stochastic knapsack
problem and its relation to the sponsored search problem. They further develop an
adaptive algorithm to solve the advertiser’s problem when the click-thru rates are
unknown. The paper, however, does not discuss or model the real-world case of
multiple ad slots with a combinatorial set of keywords.
Researchers have studied the economic properties of multi-unit auctions in great
detail. Specifically, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG) mechanism properties and associ-
ated computational details have been addressed in a number of papers. However,
there are very few papers that explicitly talk about the economic properties or
computational issues faced by auction participants, when faced with hard budget
constraints. In Benoit & Krishna [BK01], the authors show that when there are two
items and two bidders with a budget constraint, then if the items are auctioned of
sequentially, it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object first. The paper
only deals with the case of common value items and does not model cases when more
than two objects are present. However, it is evident that even in the multi-unit case,
the sequence in which one auctions of the items will result in different revenues for
the auctioneer. Thus, we need to consider all of the items at the same time and not
sequentially. Che & Gale [YG00] consider the selling of a single item and discuss
a non-linear pricing approach for the optimal allocation in the presence of budget
constraints. Ausubel & Milgrom [AM02] describe a multi-unit, ascending auction
format that can be suitably modified to account for hard budget constraints. How-
ever, their solution approach is a heuristic and the paper does not give a complete
characterization of the problem being solved. Borgs et.al. [BCI+05] discuss the lack
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of known incentive compatible (IC) mechanisms under strict budget constraints. It
is not even known whether there exists an IC mechanism when hard budget con-
straints are present.
1.3 Objective of this Dissertation
The rapid revenue growth in the paid search advertisement segment in the last
five years has resulted in a number of theoretical and empirical research papers by
researchers belonging to diverse domains such as computer science, operations re-
search, economics, marketing and statistics. As discussed in the previous section,
there has been significant work, particularly by the computer science community,
related to economic and computational properties of various sponsored search plat-
forms. There is, however, very limited amount of research that deals specifically
with the problem that advertiser’s on such platforms face. Further, modeling the
budget constrained multi-unit allocation problem has not been addressed well in
the standard auction literature. This dissertation seeks to address gaps in existing
research in these areas. We specifically model the sponsored search problem faced
by the search platform provider and the advertiser as well as discuss computational
and modeling issues for a multi-unit allocation problem with budget constraints, in
a general setting.
The first essay (chapter 2) deals with the optimization problem that sponsored search
platform providers face. We discuss current allocation and pricing models prevalent
in the search space. We, further, model the online ad allocation and pricing problem
faced by firms like Google and Yahoo as an assignment problem. Current bidding
systems allow only a single bid per keyword combination at a specific point in time.
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In our model we allow the option to specify different willingness-to-pay values for the
various positions. Further, we discuss the application of the Hungarian algorithm to
solve the assignment problem and its relation to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
set of prices. Currently, the bidders are allocated upto one ad slot, of uniform di-
mension, in any auction round. However, it is expected that biddable video and
graphic ads will be allowed by the various search providers in the near future and
thus, the bidders could be allocated more than one ad slot of standard dimension
in any iteration. We model this extension where the bidder has an option to bid
on contiguous set of ad slots and show that optimization techniques can be used to
allocate space to multi-media ads.
In the second essay (chapter 3), we discuss the problem faced by an advertiser on the
current sponsored search platforms. We use the toolkit of integer programming(IP)
to model the problem faced by the search advertiser. We examine the constraint
structure of the problem and show that the LP relaxation will have an optimal so-
lution that is integral for nearly all decision variables. In fact, we demonstrate that
we need not consider all positions while bidding for a keyword combination. Rather,
we should consider only those points that lie on the upper convex hull of the (total
revenue, total cost) plot for the specific keyword combination. Further, bidders like
eBay and Amazon, bid on millions of keywords daily on the various search platforms
. Thus, loading the bid data at different positions and solving the LP relaxation
is in itself a difficult task. We use the specific properties of the sponsored search
domain to design a column generation approach to solve the relaxation problem
faced by large advertisers. We, then, extend the column generation method and use
a branch-and-price approach to build an algorithm to solve the IP to optimality.
In the third essay (chapter 4), we formulate a multi-unit auction with additive val-
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uations and hard budget constraints. The objective of the auctioneer is assumed to
be revenue maximization. The problem is modeled using integer programming and
the computational intractability of the problem, in certain budget ranges, is demon-
strated using simulations. A Benders decomposition method is then developed and
used to solve the problem for these hard instances and an associated auction inter-
pretation is provided.
The fourth essay (chapter 5) again deals with a multi-unit auction with additive
valuations and hard budget constraints. However, the objective for the auctioneer
is social welfare maximization. Solving the social welfare maximization problem will
result in an allocation that maximizes overall value but the prices determined could
be such that the bidders and the auctioneer would have a motivation to deviate and
increase their respective surpluses. Hence, we need to modify the constraint space for
the standard social maximization model under budget constraints to obtain prices
and an allocation that are in the core (i.e., stable). In particular, assuming they
exist, we would like single item prices (i.e., Walrasian equilibrium prices) in the ad-
ditive setting. Also, of note is that unlike the unconstrained auction problem where
VCG mechanism can be used to determine the efficient allocation, for the budget
constrained auction, the VCG mechanism has no specific economic property. Thus,
we need to simultaneously determine item prices as well as allocation. Building
upon Day & Raghavan [DR07], we provide a constraint generation approach to deal
with the exponential number of constraints associated with the core and provide an
algorithm to solve the separation problem. We, also, extend the model to general





In the recent past, revenues from sponsored online search based ads for firms like
Google and Yahoo has grown tremendously. Potential advertisers provide their
valuations for various keywords, and also specify overall budget for a period of time.
The search operator then solves a multi-unit allocation problem with the specified
bidder values and budgets, and determines two things - the order to place the ads and
the amount to charge the respective bidders. In this chapter, we describe a model
and method based on mathematical programming, to solve the online sponsored
ad selection problem as an assignment problem. This would enable search engines
to efficiently solve the problem in real time and increase their revenue by solving
the problem to optimality. In contrast to the current sponsored search auction
models, our model also allows bidders to specify different willingness-to-pay based
on allocated position. We also consider the situation where text ads of varying
length or a combination of text and graphical ads can be displayed. This introduces
a packing problem and we describe two potential auction models for this problem.
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2.1 Introduction
In the last few years, a new, targeted form of consumer advertising has emerged
on the internet. These ads based on keywords specified by the consumer are called
sponsored search ads. Sponsored search keyword advertising has become a multi-
billion dollar industry with firms like Google deriving a majority of their income
from sponsored search. The industry has shown double-digit growth in revenues
and profit over the same period, and continues to expand its use of sponsored ads
as a medium for growth. This chapter describes an enhanced auction format for
sponsored search that can potentially increase the revenue from the advertisers in
sponsored ad site activities.
The essence of the problem involves potential advertisers willing to pay for being fea-
tured at the top of a list of sponsored sites whenever users (i.e. potential consumers)
do a search on some keywords, and the search company (like Google) wanting to
be paid when these links are clicked on. Generally, the higher the placement in the
set of sponsored links the better it is for the advertiser in terms of generated traffic.
Potential advertisers know this and usually bid higher amounts to get placed higher
in the set of displayed sponsored links. Conversely, the search engines only get paid
if there is a click on the sponsored link. Thus, the search engine has an incentive to
place ads that are of high quality (i.e. a higher propensity for the user to click on)
and have attracted suitably high bids.
In fact, in their use of sponsored ad-sites to generate revenue, search engines such
as Google, Bing and Yahoo have become large auction houses where they solve an
allocation and pricing problem each time the consumer initiates a search. The bid-
ders specify the maximum amount that they are willing to pay for a keyword and
also specify overall budget limits for a pre-defined time period across a set of key-
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words. The search engine operator provides options for placing bids on more than
one keyword or even combinations of keywords. Based on these bidder inputs, the
search engine operators use heuristics to determine the order of display as well as
the price paid by each advertiser for the ad placement.
The sponsored ad auction has attracted a lot of attention in the research community
recently. Feng et al. [FBP07] analyze and compare different sponsored search allo-
cation mechanisms as well as explore the effect of total number of slots auctioned
on auctioneer revenues. Rolland & Patterson [RP03] propose an expert system
to match advertisers and web users. Lim & Tang [LT05] use a simple one-stage
game theoretic model with two bidders to study how advertisers compete for posi-
tions in a search engine based on their expected click-thru rates. Weber & Zhang
[WZ07] study paid placement strategies and find that in order to maximize revenue,
the search engine design should be based on a weighted average of relative quality
performance in addition to bid amount. Kumar, Dawande & Mookerjee [KDM03]
propose a complex pricing model to maximize the search engine’s revenue; the price
is based on the number of impressions of the ad and the number of clicks on the
ad. There has also been some work that has examined efficient algorithms for allo-
cating sponsored site positions. For example, Zhan, Shen & Feng [ZSF09] examine
simultaneous pooled auctions and methods to improve revenue as well as suggest
a modified Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG) mechanism that the auctioneer can use to
get the same expected revenue as in the pooled auction.
Varian [Var07] characterizes the Nash equilibrium of Google sponsored auctions
and shows that the generalized second price auction (followed by Google, Bing and
Yahoo) is not incentive compatible and is not equivalent to the VCG mechanism.
Aggarwal et al. [AGM06] independently show the lack of truth telling as a domi-
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nant strategy for these auctions and develop a truthful mechanism called the ladder
auction. In the next section, we describe these two papers in greater detail.
2.2 Current Sponsored Search Models
The models which various sponsored search engines use for ad auctions are a vari-
ant of the auction run by Google. The auction mechanism that Yahoo used prior to
2007 can be interpreted as a special case of the Google mechanism. Varian [Var07]
uses the phrase “position auctions” to describe various variants used in the spon-
sored search domain. The paper considers an auction problem with m bidders and
K slots. Vik denotes the value that bidder i has for slot k. A key assumption in
the paper is that the bidder valuations for slots are separable i.e., the value of a
bidder for a slot can be expressed in terms of a bidder specific factor and a position
specific factor. Thus, Vik = Ui.CTRk, where Ui is the expected profit per click for
bidder i and CTRk is the click-thru rate of ad slot k. It is assumed that CTR is
a monotonically decreasing function with respect to the position i.e., the CTR at
a given position will be strictly greater than the CTR of the position below. Let
bi be the bid that bidder i places in the ad auction. Varian [Var07] first describes
an auction model where the price paid by bidder i for an allocated slot k is equal
to the bid placed by the bidder allocated slot k + 1. The paper, then, provides a
link between the symmetric Nash equilibrium prices for this auction setting and the
assignment game in which bidders can be assigned no more than one ad slot. Under
the assumption that bidder’s valuation is separable, the position auction is nothing
but a competitive equilibrium of the assignment game.
Varian [Var07] also provides an insight into the actual Google ad auction. The allo-
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cation and pricing of slots occurs in two phases. In the first phase, Google sorts the
bidders in decreasing order of their “value” to Google. Here, the value to Google is
defined as the product of advertiser’s quality score and bid. The slots are assigned
based on this ordered list. Bidders with greater value to Google will be assigned
the higher slots. In the second phase of the auction, the price paid by each bidder
is determined, conditioned on the slot allocated in the first phase. Each bidder is
expected to pay the minimum amount to retain the allocated slot. For example,
assume slot k + 1 is allocated to bidder i + 1. Bidder i + 1 has bid bi+1 and has
a quality score of ei+1. If bidder s is assigned slot k, then the price that bidder s
would pay, if a web surfer clicks on the ad, is bk+1ek+1
es
, where es is the quality score
of bidder s. Further, the paper demonstrates that the position auctions are not
incentive compatible.
Aggarwal et.al. [AGM06] independently show the lack of incentive compatibility
in sponsored search auctions. They, however, define a new auction format, called
the laddered auction, that they show is incentive compatible. Under assumption of
separability for the click-thru rate (i.e., the click-thru rate can be separated into a
bidder specific and a position specific factor), they show that their auction is revenue
equivalent to the currently used position auctions.
All search providers ask a bidder to provide a single bid associated with a keyword.
Aggarwal et.al. [AGM06] suggest that Google also uses a single bid for the respec-
tive keywords along with the expected click-thru rate at position 1. There are three
limitations of with existing sponsored search auction implementations, as well as
the research of Varian [Var07] and Aggarwal et.al. [AGM06]. The first issue is that
they do not allow bidders to express differential willingness to pay based on slot
position. In fact, this single bid that is currently obtained from the bidder makes
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a VCG implementation suffer from an effect similar to loss of “voter-sovereignty”
[AGM06]. Secondly, it is assumed that the quality score for an advertiser is indepen-
dent of position. Lastly, the models proposed by Varian [Var07] and Aggarwal et.al.
[AGM06] assume a separable structure for bidder valuations and click-thru rates
respectively. Our model allows bidders to bid differently for the various slots and
thus, provides an option to improve rank under a VCG implementation. We, also,
provide the option to have differential quality scores for the bidders as a function
of position. Further, our model does not rely on the assumption of separability of
either the bidder valuations or the click-thru rates.
2.3 Proposed Assignment Model
In this section, we address all the limitations of the current sponsored search mod-
els described in the previous section and model closely the sponsored ad problem.
We formulate the item pricing and allocation problem from the perspective of the
auctioneer (search engine operator). The auctioneer sells K slots to the bidders and
aims to maximize its expected revenue while adhering to specified budget constraint
and individual rationality, based on declared values. The auctioneer is assumed to
have estimates for the click-thru rates (i.e. the probability that a user will click on
an ad at a specific position) based on statistical analysis of historical data. The
bidders, in turn, bid for combination of various key words at the respective slot
positions and specify their aggregate budget for the day.
The setup for our model is as follows - a user specifies the search words to the search
engine operator. The search engine operator (auctioneer) has bids and budget from
the advertisers as well as historical data that indicates the probability that the dis-
played ads will be clicked on. The bidder then solves an optimization problem to
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maximize the expected value subject to various constraints.
The click-thru rate defined above is a function of the “degree of match” and the
“position”. The degree of match is defined as the number of keywords in the bidder
defined bundle that match what is specified by a user (e.g., - if an internet user
searches for the words ‘hat coat’ and say a bidder has bid for a bundle ‘hat coat
shoes’, then the degree of match is 2). In our model, we assume that the click-thru
rates are symmetric i.e. any keyword set with the same degree of match will have
at the same click-thru rate at the respective position. For example, let us assume
that the web user specified the search term hat coat shoe. Then, in our model we
assume that the click-thru rates for the words hat and coat will be the same for a
given bidder. This assumption is not restrictive but allows us to reduce the number
of active bids in our model.
Let us assume there are m bidders and K slots (or positions). V
′k
ij denotes the value
that bidder i has for keyword bundle j at slot k. Let bi be the current budget level
of bidder i. The decision variables for the above problem are xkij ∈ {0, 1} (the allo-
cation of keyword bundle j at position k to bidder i). The estimated click-through
rate for bundle j at position k is denoted by ckj . The auctioneer’s objective is to
maximize the total expected value obtained from all the bidders.
The number of bids from each bidder in the model can also be reduced from an
exponential order to linear in the number of keywords as follows. For each degree
of match, at every position, select the maximum bid from the bidder. Thus, the
number of active bids from each bidder reduces from order K(2n−1) to Kn , where
n is the number of keywords specified by the user and K is the number of ad slots.
The index j, henceforth, is used to represent the number of keyword matches i.e.
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the degree of match. Note that the degree of match for a keyword combination
is incorporated in the estimated click-thru rate, ckj . Also, in the pre-processing
stage, for every user specified search, the auctioneer will take the current remaining
budget of bidder i into account to determine the respective input bid for any bidder
i.e. V kij = min{V
′k






















xkij ≤ 1; for i = 1..m (2.3)
xkij ∈ {0, 1}; for i = 1..m, j = 1..n, k = 1..K (2.4)
Constraint (2.2) indicates that no slot can be allocated to more than one bidder
while constraint (2.3) indicates that no bidder can be allocated to more than one
slot. Constraints (2.2) and (2.3) together constitute a TUM matrix. In fact, the
above problem is an assignment problem where every bidder is bidding on specific
slots. For every bidder and for each slot k, find V ki = maxj{V kijckj} 1. The assignment
problem that the auctioneer solves is with V ki as the value that bidder i has for slot
k and the decision variable being xki .














xki ≤ 1; for k = 1..K (2.6)∑
k=1..K
xki ≤ 1; for i = 1..m (2.7)
xki ∈ {0, 1}; for i = 1..m, k = 1..K (2.8)
Thus, the auctioneer can solve a linear program to determine the allocation. Al-
ternatively, specialized algorithms like the well-known Hungarian method [Wol98]
obviate the need for using any optimization software to solve the problem. The
above method can easily be extended to settings where the click-thru rate is a func-
tion of other parameters like reputation of the bidder along with degree of match.
For example, ckj can be modeled as the product of three functions, f(i), g(j | length
of search term) and h(k). f(i) is a measure of bidder reputation for bidder i, h(k)
is an exponential decay function to measure the effect of position on click-thru
rate[FBP07] and g(j | length of search term) measures the degree of fit for keyword
j, given the search term specified by the search user.
From Leonard [Leo83], we know that we can get the VCG price and allocation for
an assignment model by solving two sequential linear programs. The first problem
to be solved would correspond to the primal assignment problem described above.
The second problem to be solved would use the dual variables ui and vk. The vk
variables will correspond to the VCG prices while ui will be the respective bidder











vk = Obj (2.11)
ui, vk ≥ 0; for i = 1..m, k = 1..K (2.12)
Here Obj is the objective function value corresponding to the optimal solution to
the primal assignment problem. Note however, we can in fact, obtain the allocation
and VCG prices by solving the assignment problem using the Hungarian algorithm
[BdVSV02]. Demange et.al. [DGS86] use the Hungarian approach but increase the
price of each item in the over-demanded set by a single unit in each iteration. We
will, however, determine the price increment in each iteration using the standard
Hungarian procedure i.e., the dual variables for the assignment constraints may
change by more than a single unit.
Note that solving the assignment problem with the Hungarian algorithm provides
expected VCG payments. To find the actual amount that a bidder pays each time
her ad is clicked on, we proceed as follows: If a bidder i has been allocated slot k,
then the amount the bidder will pay is vk
ckj
; where ckj corresponds to the click-thru
rate for the bundle that maximized V kijc
j
k for bidder i and vk is the VCG price for
the keyword combination k.
The sponsored ad auction model we describe here is in fact equivalent to bidders
bidding in a multi-unit setting with unit demand (as the ad auctions are run repeat-
edly during the day). This naturally raises the question whether using VCG is each
round is incentive compatible. We show that, even under this multi-round setting,
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solving for the VCG outcome for every search instance is not incentive compatible
as the following theorem illustrates.
Theorem 1. For the sponsored search auction, modeled as a static game with one
round, truthful reporting of true value and budget is a dominant strategy for every
bidder under VCG mechanism. However, for multiple rounds under budget con-
straints, the VCG solution for each round does not result in truthful reporting for
the bidders.
Proof. Let us assume that the bidder’s have the same value for any slot that they
are allocated i.e. they place a single bid for all slots. We will now consider the single
stage as well as the multi-stage auction setting.
1. Single stage auction - The bidders declare their value for slots (denoted by
vi) and the budget (denoted by (bi)). The auctioneer selects those bidders
for whom the vi ≤ bi i.e., only those bidders that have sufficient budget to
participate in the auction. Thus, the budget constraint is not binding for any
of the bidders and is not relevant to the single round pricing and allocation
problem. The proof of truthfulness is identical to that for VCG.
2. Multi stage auction - Let the true value and budget of the bidders be (v1, b1)
and (v2, b2) respectively. Also, let b1 > v1 and v2 > b2. Further, we assume
v1 > v2. Assume that both the bidders bid their true values and budgets. We
shall show that one of the bidders can do better ex-post by deviating from her
true value.
For the first round, bidder 1 gets the slot and pays v2 to the auctioneer, under
the VCG scheme. Thus, the remaining budget of bidder 1 is (b1 − v2). For
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the second round, the effective bid of bidder 1 will be min{v1, (b1− v2)} while
that of bidder 2 remains v2. If v1 ≤ (b1 − v2), then bidder 1 gets the slot and
pays a price of v2. However, if v1 > (b1− v2), then the following two cases can
occur:
(a) If v2 > b1/2, then the slot is allocated to bidder 2 at a price of b1 − v2
(b) If v2 ≤ b1/2, then the slot is allocated to bidder 1 at a price of v2
Thus, we have a case corresponding to v2 > b1/2, where the price paid by the
bidder is not independent of her bid. Thus, truth-telling is not a dominant
strategy for the bidders.
Note that the theorem illustrates an extreme situation. Most search auctions in-
volve a large number of bidders, multiple keyword bundles, large number of auctions
through the day and a budget that is usually irrelevant for a particular instance or
even many multiple instances of the problem. Thus, for most practical purposes,
despite the result of Theorem 1, we believe, payments as discussed prior to Theorem
1 are appropriate.
There are two key aspects to the superiority of our proposed model over that being
used by Google, Bing and Yahoo. First, the current search platforms accept only
a single bid for the advertiser. The advertiser, thus, determines the position that
maximizes her revenue metric for the keyword combination and bids accordingly.
However, since the search platform provider doesn’t guarantee a specific position,
the advertiser could be allocated a lower position and end up paying higher than
her value for that position. Thus, the model followed by Google or Yahoo will result
in “advertiser regret”. In our implementation, since we collect and use bids for each
position that the keyword could be bid to, the advertiser doesn’t face any regret no
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matter what position the keyword combinations are slotted at.
Secondly, in the current Google implementation, the estimated click-thru rate for
the first position for each keyword combination is used to determine the order of
allocation. In our model, we use the click-thru rates at all positions to arrive at
the optimal answer and thus, are able to arrive at a superior value maximization
outcome.
2.4 Models for Multiple Slot Allocation
The current sponsored search models do not provide the bidders an opportunity to
be allocated more than one slot for a specific search instance. Search engines like
Ask currently support graphical images in their search feature. It is, thus, conceiv-
able in the future one could have a combination of text and image ads displayed
in the sponsored search results. In the recent past, various search engines such as
Google and Bing have explored options for placing search-based ads with formats
differing from the standard text ads. These graphical ads could possibly span multi-
ple slots and thus, the auctioneer would need to account for the varying dimensions
of the image while allocating space to the bidders. Here, we describe two models
for allocating sponsored search ads where the ad spans across contiguous slots.
Model 1(a)
In this model, the search engine operator can display both banner and text ads based
on the search term specified. We aim to solve the winner determination problem
when the auctioneer is intending to maximize revenue, given the bid declarations.
This model can also be used for modeling the case of displaying only text ads but
with variable length. Bidders bid for relative position and length of the displayed
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advertisement. The auctioneer aims to maximize revenue and the bidders are as-
sumed to pay only if the ads are clicked on.
Let the basic unit of available space be a slot. The number of slots is assumed to
be L. Hence, each bidder can place up to L(L + 1)/2 bids. Also, let p indicate the
package index. Each package is composed of two elements [Rp, Lp], where Rp is the
relative position of the advertisement and Lp is the length of the ad. For e.g., in a 3
slot allocation problem the number of possible packages that the bidder could place
bids on would be 6 and the package index would be as follows:







The auctioneer wants to maximize her revenue subject to the following constraints:
1. No bidder is allocated more than one package.
2. The total length of the allocated packages cannot exceed the available space.
3. The allocation of slots is contiguous and no two allocated packages can have
the same relative position.
Decision variables for the problem are:
1. xip ∈ {0, 1}; 1, if bidder i is allocated package p; 0, otherwise
2. yp ∈ {0, 1}; 1, if package p has been allocated to any bidder; 0, otherwise
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xip ≤ 1; for i = 1..m (2.14)∑
i=1..m
xip ≤ yp; for p = 1..P (2.15)∑
p=1..P













...and so forth (2.17)
xip, yp ∈ {0, 1}; for i = 1..m, p = 1..P (2.18)
Here, P is the total number of packages. The number of equations in (2.17) will be
equal to the number of slots available for the auction. Also, the formulation above
can further be strengthened by generating cover inequalities corresponding to the
0/1 knapsack constraint (2.16). (2.14) indicates that no bidder can be allocated
more than one package. (2.16) ensures that the length of the slots allocated doesn’t
violate the available slot length. (2.15) and (2.17) are feasibility constraints for the
allocated packages. (2.17) checks for feasibility of package allocation, while taking
the relative position of the packages into account. For example, in the three slot
auction case, we can have only one of the packages with index 1, 2 and 3 be assigned
to bidders in the optimal solution i.e. y1 + y2 + y3 ≤ 1. The relative position of the
three packages is 1 and thus, these three packages would occupy overlapping slots, if
more than one of the packages was assigned to the various bidders. (2.17) prevents
25
the occurrence of this infeasible solution.
The model detailed above actually corresponds to solving an auctioneer’s problem
with exact keyword match. The Overture model (used by Yahoo prior to 2007) was
a special case of the above general model (Lp = 1 for all packages). Although the
model above doesn’t take into account the click-thru rate, one can model the same
by modifying the constants in the objective function to cipVip instead of Vip above,
where cip is the click-thru rate. The modification for click-thru gives an allocation
where the auctioneer is maximizing expected value over exact match bids only. The
current Google model would, hence, be a special case of this modified formulation
(again, Lp =1 for all packages and instead of cip, Google uses ci1).
Model 1(b) (inexact match; combinatorial bids on keywords):
The package is now defined as [Rp, Lp, (keyword combination)]. The bidder sub-
mits the bids for various packages to the proxy agent. The auctioneer, then, finds
for every feasible [Rp, Lp] combination the keyword grouping which maximizes the
cjipVip. Thus, once the auctioneer does this pre-processing, the problem effectively
reduces to that described earlier in model 1(a).
Model 2
The bidders place direct bids on the contiguous slots. The model we propose here is
the same as Model 1 but the mathematical formulation is different. If the auctioneer
has 3 slots to auction off, the possible packages that the bidders could bid on would
be
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The package [1, 3] will not be a feasible package as the respective slots are not con-
tiguous. If the number of slots being auctioned off is L, then the maximum number
of packages that the bid on will be L(L+ 1)/2.
Let i be the bidder index, j the package index and k the index on slots. The
auctioneer’s problem can be stated as maximizing value (or expected value, as the
case maybe) subject to no package being allocated to more than one bidder and
that the overall allocation should not have overlapping slots. The decision variable











xij ≤ 1; for i = 1..m (2.20)∑
i=1..m





xij) ≤ 1; for k = 1..K (2.22)
xij ∈ {0, 1}; for i = 1..m, j = 1..P (2.23)
Here, P is the total number of packages. Equations (2.20) and (2.21) ensure that no
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bidder is allocated more than one package and no package is allocated to more than
one bidder. (2.22) indicates that the allocated slots are part of a feasible package.
Here, is akj a constant, which takes a value of 1, if slot k is part of package j and
0, otherwise. As discussed for Model 1, one can modify the objective function to
include click-thru rate so that the auctioneer maximizes expected revenue.
Let us define matrix, A, such that akj is an element of matrix A. A will be a
matrix with K rows and P columns, where K is the number of slots and P is
the maximum package index. For the three slot auction example, A will have the
following structure:

1 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1









Here, eT is a row vector of 1’s while A is an interval matrix and therefore, TUM. In
fact, the interval matrix A is identical for each slot. The first two blocks consisting
of eT and I correspond to the constraint set (2.20)-(2.21) while the last block com-
prised of the A’s corresponds to (2.22). Notice that the various blocks are TUM.
Preliminary results with this formulation show all LP relaxations are integral. The
TUM structure of parts of the constraint matrix may offer an apparent explanation
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Table 2.1: Max weight bipartite matching (Hungarian Approach) (in secs)
Slots Bidders = 20 50 100 200 500
5 0 0 0 0.2 1.18
10 0 0 0 0 1.7
20 0 0 0 0 2.5
50 0 0 0 2.8
100 0 0.58 3.1
200 0.4 3.4
500 3.8
for this. Consequently, Model 2 is preferred over Model 1.
2.5 Computational Experiments
All of the models were tested with simulated data. The structure of the generated
data for the sponsored search assignment problem was as follows - data was gener-
ated on the bids and click-thru rates for various keyword bundle, ad slot and bidder
combination. Click-thru rates and bids varied with the degree of match and rank of
the ad according to the following rules:
1. The bid for each match decreases with position (i.e. lower the position, lower
is the willingness to pay).
2. For the same degree of match, the click-thru rate decreases with position (i.e.
reduces as we go lower down in terms of position). Also, for the same position,
the click-thru rate decreases as the degree of match reduce.
Table 2.1 shows the solution time for the ad assignment problem, solved using Hun-
garian algorithm implemented on an Intel Pentium M 1.6 GHz processor with 512
MB RAM. The algorithm was implemented in C. The time shown is the average
time over 10 randomly generated problem instances for each bidder-slot combination.
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Table 2.2: IP solution for Model 1 (in secs)
Slots Bidders = 50 100 200
5 0.06 0.5 0.34
10 0.3 0.51 1.26
Table 2.3: IP solution for Model 2 (in secs)
Slots Bidders = 50 100 200
5 0.18 0.28 0.64
10 0.66 1.21 3.27
The results show that we can, in fact, include click-thru rates, combinatorial set of
keywords and differential willingness to pay for every bidder and still arrive at an
optimal allocation almost instantaneously. This obviates the need for using heuris-
tics, which is the current industry practice.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the time to determine optimal allocation for the integer
programs corresponding to the multiple slot allocation problems model 1 and 2,
respectively. The solution was obtained using OPL Studio 7.0 on an Intel Pentium
801 MHz processor with 512 MB RAM. The time shown is the average time over 5
randomly generated problem instances for each bidder-slot combination.
The results show that an additional dimension of length for the search ads can be
incorporated into the model and problem sizes typically faced by current search
operators can be solved very quickly. Adding cover inequalities as well as analysis




In this chapter, we have modeled the sponsored search problem faced by a search
provider as an assignment problem and have shown a way to calculate the VCG
prices for the same. Currently, a VCG based auction is used by Facebook for its ad
platform. Our model includes bids for the various positions for each keyword com-
bination unlike the current models where only a single bid is imputed for a specific
keyword. Further, we account for the different click-thru rates that a keyword en-
counters at various positions. These modifications help to deal with advertiser regret
in current models and also, provides a higher social value. The changes proposed in
our model, however, still allow the problem to be solved nearly instantaneously.
We, also, extend the current models to include bidding on multiple contiguous slots,
a feature not feasible in current models. This approach can be used for search adver-
tising as well be extended for an auction based framework for banner ads of different
sizes. We could, also, easily extend our modeling framework to include features such
as volume discounts and bidding language to limit competition.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Bid Determination in
Sponsored Search
In the last seven years, internet search based ads have been the fastest growing
segment in the entire advertising domain and account for nearly half of the online
advertising spend. Potential advertisers provide their valuations for various key-
words and also, specify overall budget for a period of time. The search operator,
then, solves a multi-unit allocation problem with the specified bidder values and
budgets, and determines two things - the order to place the ads and the amount to
charge the respective bidders. The advertisers, on the other hand, regularly solve a
bid determination problem for the various keywords, given their respective budgets
and other business constraints. In this chapter, we provide an optimization-based
methodology to solve the advertiser’s bid determination problem in sponsored search
auctions. We first prove some structural properties of the optimal solution in such a
setting. Finally, we consider the large scale nature of this problem, and based on the
structural properties of the optimal solution, develop an efficient solution methodol-
ogy to rapidly solve this problem. Traditional linear programming (LP) and integer
programming (IP) methods are not particularly suited for this problem as the largest
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advertisers are known to bid on close to a million keywords with shared revenue met-
rics many times in a day. Thus, even loading all the keyword data and performing
simple data manipulation tasks like numeric ordering is a computationally intensive
exercise.
3.1 Introduction
The search engines earn a large portion of their revenue by being a multi-unit, auc-
tion platform for text ad inventory. The search based advertising platforms like
Google, Yahoo, Bing etc. provide the following basic framework - firms wanting
to advertise select a set of keyword combinations to bid on. These advertisers also
specify their respective daily budgets. When a search user types a word or a set of
words in the search box, the platforms will match the user specified terms to the
keywords bid on by the firms, determine an order to display the ads in and also
determine the amount that the firm has to pay if the user clicks on the displayed
ad. This model is often called the pay-per-click (PPC) model. The match type is
selected by the firm and in general, belongs to one of the four types - broad, exact,
negative and phrase match. Bing additionally provides functionality to further fil-
ter the match based on consumer demographics. Insufficient budget for a campaign
can adversely affect the advertiser’s performance as the corresponding ads are not
displayed once the daily budget is exceeded.
The payment and allocation rules vary across various search platforms. However,
they all are variants of Google’s Adwords model. This model allocates the advertis-
ers slots based on a multiplicative function of a proxy for the click-thru rates (often
referred to as the quality score) and the advertiser’s bid. The payment rule on the
various platforms is, typically, an increment over the bid (or a function of bid and
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quality score) of the bidder allocated the immediate lower ad position.
Given the rules and mechanisms of the search ad platforms, the advertisers face a
computationally difficult problem. The bids of the competitors for the respective
keywords are not known. Also, the number of keywords that advertisers bid on
daily varies from a few thousand for small enterprises to tens of millions for firms
like eBay and Amazon. The cost curve, revenue potential and the click-thru rate
that the advertiser faces for each keyword is an unknown function of the position
the ad is shown on. Reports available on the various platforms let the advertiser
know the daily number of times the ads corresponding to each of the keyword com-
binations were shown, the number of clicks that the ads got, the average position
where the ad was displayed and the cost per click incurred by the advertiser for
each keyword combination. Further, from analysis of the web data log files on the
advertiser’s server, the advertiser can make an estimate of the revenue generated
per ad click corresponding to each keyword combination. Once these estimates have
been determined, the firm still has to understand the performance trade-off between
the keywords, given the daily allocated budget.
The rapid growth of the search ad domain has spurred research activity in the com-
puter science, economics and operations research community specifically addressing
issues related to various sponsored ad platforms. This research has primarily been
focused on modeling the problem that search platform providers like Google and
Yahoo face. Feng et.al. [FBP07] analyze and compare different sponsored search
allocation mechanisms as well as explore the effect of total number of slots auctioned
on auctioneer revenues. Rolland & Patterson [RP03] propose an expert system to
match advertisers and web users. Lim & Tang [LT05] use a simple one-stage game
theoretic model with two bidders to study how advertisers compete for positions in a
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search engine based on their expected click-thru. Weber & Zheng [WZ07] study paid
placement strategies and find that in order to maximize revenue, the search engine
design should be based on a weighted average of relative quality performance in ad-
dition to bid amount. Varian [Var07] characterizes the Nash equilibrium of Google
sponsored auctions and also, shows that the generalized second price auction (fol-
lowed by Google and Yahoo) is not incentive compatible and is not equivalent to the
VCG mechanism. Aggarwal et.al. [AGM06] independently show the lack of truth
telling as a dominant strategy for these auctions and develop a truthful mechanism
called the ladder auction.
Although there have been a few papers addressing the problem faced by the search
provider, there is very limited research into the problem faced by the advertisers.
To our knowledge, there are only four papers of note that have attempted to address
issues that the search advertisers face. Kitts & Leblanc [KL04] provide an overview
of the various problems that the advertiser faces. They discuss the bid determina-
tion formulation as well as parameters that need to be estimated to solve the bid
determination problem. However, they do not describe solution methods or solu-
tion algorithms. Rusmevichientong & Williamson [RW06] formulate the keyword
selection problem that advertisers face. They first formulate the problem assuming
knowledge about the click-thru rates for various keywords. The paper develops a
link with the stochastic knapsack problem for the static case and uses that as a
baseline to provide an adaptive algorithm when the click-thru probabilities are un-
known. The authors do not consider multiple positions for the keyword and thus,
are not able to capture the trade-off that occurs between keywords at various po-
sitions. Ghose & Yang [GY08] model the relationship between the click-thru rate,
conversion rate and bid with variables such as as position, keyword length and in-
formation specificity (brand terms v/s retailer specific terms). They show that the
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revenue potential of keywords varies significantly when compared to each other.
Further, they demonstrate a strong impact of the position attained by the keyword
on observed revenue. Thus, the paper makes a strong case for using optimization
techniques to determine optimal bids, although the authors do not address this is-
sue in their paper. Feldman et.al. [FMPS07] discuss a simple heuristic based on
randomization between two uniform bid strategies that advertisers can use to bid
on keywords. The authors assume that the advertiser has flexible daily budgets and
the auction market is static. The heuristic has the same bid for all keywords and
adjusts budgets for the following day based on prior days overspend/ underspend.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that (i) the structural aspects of
the search advertiser’s problem have been studied, and (ii) a solution algorithm to
solve large-scale versions (i.e., of real-world size) of this problem has been provided.
Given the novelty of sponsored search, there is a critical need for research tools
and techniques that support advertisers in their efforts to bid optimally in search
auctions. The methods described in following sections fill this academic and practical
need.
3.2 Problem Formulation & Model Description
The popular sponsored search auctions (Google, Yahoo, Bing, Ask etc.) are, typ-
ically, next-price auctions. The advertiser determines the set of keyword combi-
nations that she believes are related to her business and will generate the desired
traffic. The advertiser then determines the amount of money that she is going to
spend each day on the advertising campaign. Also, for each keyword combination
selected, the advertiser has to place a bid. This bid determines the position that
the ad will be placed in, whenever there is a search user who specifies the keyword
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combination. Each of the platform providers have their own proprietary method for
determining the order of ad placement. However, although the systems are like a
black-box for the advertiser, she can use her own historical data, along with aggre-
gate historical data, to determine the various revenue and cost parameters.
The problem that the advertiser solves is of revenue maximization. We could model
the objective as profit maximization too, by comparing the revenue generated by a
click to the cost of the click. However, it appears that in the industry advertisers
typically have specified budgets to spend and do not have utility for any unspent
amount. Based on the past data, it is reasonable to believe the advertiser has
available the estimated expected cost and the expected revenue or benefit for a
keyword at the various positions. This may be obtained by experimentation. Please
note that for all future discussions in this chapter the words keyword and keyword
combination can be used interchangeably. Let the keywords the advertiser has
selected to be bid for be denoted by i. Also, let posi be the position that the keyword
is bid to, B be the advertiser’s daily budget and bidi be the bid for keyword i. bidi is
the decision variable for the advertiser. The advertiser has to estimate the following
functions -
1. posi = f(bidi)⇒ estimated position for keyword i when placing a bid of bidi
2. clicki = g(i, posi) ⇒ estimated daily clicks for the keyword combination i, if
allocated position posi
3. revi = h(i, posi) ⇒ estimated average revenue per click for keyword i if allo-
cated to position posi
4. cpci = l(i, posi) ⇒ estimated cost per click (CPC) for keyword i if allocated
to position posi
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cpci.clicki ≤ B (3.2)
bidi ≥ bidi,min (3.3)
Here bidi,min is the minimum bid required for a keyword to participate in any auction
on a search engine.
We now show below how the above problem is reformulated as an integer program.
The input data to the IP model is -
1. Rij - expected total revenue for keyword i at position j. This value is ob-
tained by multiplying the revenue per click obtained at the various positions
to the number of clicks that the keyword combination attracts at the respective
positions.
2. Cij - expected total cost for keyword i at position j. This value is obtained
by multiplying the cost per click obtained at the various positions (available
through the reports provided by Google, Bing, Yahoo etc.) to the number of
clicks that the keyword combination attracts at the respective positions.
3. B - budget for the advertiser
The decision variable for the advertiser is the position that she should bid each
keyword to. Once we know what position we should bid a keyword to, we can find
out the related bid as we assume that we know the cost landscape (i.e. once we know
the cost per click (CPC) for keyword i at some position j, then we need to bid a
small increment over the CPC to get that position). Thus, the decision variable is
-
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xij, where xij = 1, if keyword i is allocated to position j and is 0, otherwise. Also,
x0j denotes a slack variable that takes a value 1, if the optimization model decides
not to bid for the keyword i.e. chooses position 0. The corresponding total revenue
and total cost for position 0 are Ri0 and Ci0, both of which equal zero.














Cijxij ≤ B (3.6)
xij ∈ {0, 1}; for i = 1..n, j = 0..m (3.7)
Proposition 1. IPOPT is NP-complete
Proof. If j = 1 i.e. only one slot is available for bidding, then IPOPT reduces to
the knapsack problem. Thus, it is NP-complete.
Proposition 2. The LP relaxation of IPOPT can have no more than two fractional
xij. Further, the fractional allocation corresponds to one keyword combination.
Proof. The optimal solution to the LP relaxation of IPOPT is a basic feasible
solution and hence, can have upto n+1 of the xij variables as non-zero, as there are
n+ 1 rows in the formulation. Due to the equality sign in the first set of constraints
in IPOPT , the separable nature of these constraints will result in every constraint
having at least one xij greater than zero. Thus, for the first set of constraints to be
satisfied, either n of the xij variables will be greater than zero or n + 1 of the xij
variables will be greater than zero. Hence, there are only three possibilities for the
optimal solution to the LP relaxation - n of the xij variables equal 1, n − 1 of the
xij variables equal 1 and two xij are fractional (with one being a slack variable) or
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n− 1 of the xij variables equal 1 and two xij variables are fractional, while adding
upto 1.
For an advertiser bidding on any of the platforms (Google, Yahoo, Bing, Ask etc.),
the following assumptions are observed to be true -
1. Number of clicks increase as we move to a higher position
2. Cost per click at a higher position is never lower than that at a lower position,
for a given keyword. Thus, total expected cost increases at higher positions
3. Total revenue increases with position; thus, providing an incentive for the
advertisers to bid for higher slots.
Theorem 2. For every keyword combination i, find the convex hull of the (Rij, Cij)
pairs. Any (Rij, Cij) pair not on the convex hull will not be in the optimal solution
to the LP relaxation of IPOPT .
Proof. Suppose that xij > 0 in the optimal solution for some (i, j) tuple, for which






Since xij is part of the optimal solution for the relaxed problem, the objective
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new solution will be feasible for the original relaxed problem. Let New OPT denote
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i.e.(Ri,j+1 −Ri,j−1)Cij − Ci,j+1(Rij −Ri,j−1)− Ci,j−1(Ri,j+1 −Rij)Ci,j+1 ≥ 0
Thus, New OPT > OPT and hence, xij > 0 cannot be part of the optimal solution.
In other words, for every keyword combination i, only those (Rij, Cij) pairs that are
on the upper convex hull can be part of the optimal solution.
The (Rij, Cij) pairs are in a plane and the plot is monotonically non-decreasing.
We use the following algorithm to determine the convex hull for each keyword.
Algorithm 1 (Convex Hull Algorithm for a Keyword).
1. For the keyword i, initialize variables newj to 0 and convex list to {}.
2. Find the slopes (i.e.
Rij−Ri,newj
Cij−Ci,newj
) from newj to all other j
′s for keyword i, such
that j > newj.
3. Determine the j with the highest slope. This j lies on the convex hull.
4. Update newj ← j and convex list← convex list ∪ {j}.
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Figure 3.1: Convex Hull for a Keyword.
5. If newj is not the highest j available for the given i, then GO TO Step 2. Else
STOP.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the convex hull that we calculate for each keyword. Note
that in the following sections, any reference to position corresponds to only relevant
positions i.e. positions for the keyword that lie on the convex hull described above.
Thus, all the indices for position would be referring only to the points on the convex
hull. Further, index 0 corresponds to the origin.
3.3 Algorithm to solve LP relaxation
From proposition 1, we know that the advertiser’s problem is computationally dif-
ficult. Based on proposition 2 we can now develop an algorithm to solve the LP
relaxation of IPOPT and get a solution where only one keyword combination will
have a fractional allocation. The intuition for the algorithm to solve the LP re-
laxation to optimality is as follows - allocate the keyword combinations to various
relevant positions greedily. Specifically, order the keyword-position pairs by their
descending bang−for−buck ratios. Keep on allocating the keywords in order till the
allocation results in the budget constraint either being exactly matched or exceeded.
If the keyword allocation that results in the budget constraint being violated has
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been already allocated to a certain position, then take a convex combination of the
allocations to the current and previous allocation such that the budget constraint
is satisfied. This final allocation will correspond to the fractional component in the
optimal solution. The steps below formally describe the algorithm and solve the LP
relaxation of the advertiser’s problem to optimality.
Algorithm 2 (LP Optimal Algorithm).
1. Initialize list to blank (the list has a structure [Rij Cij flagij]). For each
keyword i, find (Rij, Cij) pairs that lie on the convex hull of the Rij v/s Cij
plot and add to the list. Initially, all flagij are set to zero. Also, i varies
between 1 to n and j varies between 0 to m (0 is a dummy slot corresponding
to no bid ).









Cij−Ci,j−1 ; Also, set Bnew = current available budget
(initially, set to B).
3. Let xi0 = 1 for all i (i.e. initially, each keyword is allocated to the dummy
slot). Set all flagi0 to 1.
4. Select the highest
∆Rij
∆Cij
from the list that have flagij set to 0. If none exists,
then STOP
5. Let π = Bnew
∆Cij
. If π < 1, then set xij to π, xi,j−1 to (1− π) and STOP. Else set
xij to 1 and xi,j−1 to 0.
6. Set flagij to 1, for the current i and j.
7. GO TO Step 4.
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Proof. Here we provide a proof of optimality for the above algorithm. Let l be
the last keyword assigned (to a position other than slot 0) before the budget is
exhausted (i.e. the keyword under consideration in Step 5 when the algorithm ter-
minates). The position that l is assigned is j. Also, let A be the set of keywords
that are assigned to some position other than 0, i.e. xi0 6= 1 for i ∈ A and let A be
the set of keywords which at the termination of the algorithm are still assigned to
slot 0 i.e. xi0 = 1 for i ∈ A.





s.t. Cijy + λi ≥ Rij ∀i, j
y, λi ≥ 0






, λl = Rlj − Cljy.
Also, let λi = Rij − Cijy for iεA, where j is the position that i has been bid to
at the termination of our algorithm. For iεA, λi = 0. Now, to prove optimality of
our algorithm, we will have to show primal feasibility, feasibility of the dual values
described above and complementary slackness of the primal and dual solutions.
1. Primal feasibility - by construction of the algorithm
2. Dual Feasibility - For iεA, λi = 0. Thus, we need to show that Cijy ≥ Rij.
Now, for j = 0, this holds trivially. For j 6= 0, since keyword l was selected

































Now, Ri0 = Ci0 = 0. Hence, using the ordering of our algorithm along with





i.e. y ≥ Rij′
Cij′
∀iεA and
j′ = 1..m. Thus, dual feasible.




Cijxij) = 0 ⇒ is true by the construction of our algorithm as







xij) = 0 ⇒ For iεA, λi = 0. For iεA,
∑
j xij = 1 (by the
algorithm). For i = l, we will have two cases - either xi1 > 0 or there
exists two xij that are fractional and add upto 1. In the first case, λl = 0




(c) xij(Cijy + λi − Rij) = 0 ⇒ For iεA, xij = 0. For i = l, λl = Rlj − Cljy.
Now for iεA, let j be the position to which i is bid. By our algorithm,
xij = 0 for j 6= j. For j = j, λi = Rij − Cijy. Hence, all complementary
slackness conditions are satisfied.














akjxkj ≥ B (3.9)∑
jεNk
xkj = 1 (3.10)
xkj ≥ 0, integer (3.11)
Here, the coefficients ckj and akj are non-negative and Nk is the set of multiple
choice classes that are mutually exclusive. The authors describe the applicability of
the above formulation to problems in capital budgeting, menu planning and system
design for reliability. The paper discusses an algorithm to solve the LP relaxation of
the above problem. The sponsored search problem can be mapped to the multiple
choice knapsack problem as follows - the coefficient ckj is similar to Rij, akj to Cij
and the choice class Nk correspond to the various positions that we are bidding
to. Also, the objective function changes to a maximization function instead to the
minimization objective in the above definition. The algorithm detailed by Sinha
& Zoltners [SZ79] is similar to the one described earlier for the sponsored search
problem. However, our proof of optimality is more direct and quite different from
that in Sinha & Zoltners [SZ79].
Zemel [Zem84] and Dyer [Dye84] independently provide an O(n) algorithm to solve
the LP corresponding to the multiple-choice knapsack problem. Both papers use
the convexity property of the dual function and a partitioning approach to arrive at
an optimal solution. Pisinger [Pis95] uses an expanding core approach to determine
the set of solution points that have a high probability of yielding an optimal answer
for the IP.
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3.4 Column Generation Approach
The bidding problem that the advertisers solve daily is very large. Typically, for
medium to large sized advertiser the number of keywords that they bid on daily
can vary from tens of thousands to about a million. The largest advertisers in the
search domain like eBay and Amazon are rumored to place bids on millions of key-
words everyday. However, the largest keyword groups that share a common set of
revenue metrics, budget target and objective function is of the order of a few hun-
dred thousand. Hence, solving the LP relaxation of the problem may itself be an
insurmountable task. The huge number of variables and constraints involved, along
with the natural decomposible structure of the advertiser’s problem, necessitates
the need for a column generation approach to solve the LP relaxation as well as
embedding it within a branch-and-bound algorithm to solve the IP.
To solve the advertiser’s optimal bid determination problem using column genera-
tion, we will use the following propositions.
Proposition 3. Let A be the set of keywords which have columns corresponding
to all their possible positions included in our consideration set. For a keyword iεA
allocated to a given position ‘j’ in the current iteration, the keyword can never be
allocated to a position higher than ‘j’ in any future iteration. Thus, these columns
can be removed from further consideration. As a consequence, for a given keyword
iεA, any keyword not allocated to a position 1 to m in the current iteration will
never be part of the final optimal solution and thus, can be deleted from the problem.
Proof. Let some iεA, where i is a keyword with all its columns added in some
prior iteration, be allocated to position j in current iteration. Thus, by our LP
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optimal algorithm, i was allocated to some position 1,2, .., j − 1 in some previous






, where l is the last keyword allocated by our algorithm
to some position j. The entering variable for the next iteration will have columns
with bang-for-buck greater than
∆Rlj
∆Clj
. This new keyword, using our LP optimal
algorithm will either be considered for allocation to a position before keyword i
or after keyword i. If this new keyword is allocated before i, then the remaining
budget when determining the position that i will be allocated to is less than that
of the previous iteration. Thus, i cannot be allocated to a higher position than
last iteration. If the new keyword is allocated after i, then the remaining budget
when i is allocated is the same as the last iteration. Since, in the last iteration the
keyword i was optimally determined to be allocated to position j with the given
remaining budget, the allocation will remain optimal in the current iteration too.
Thus, positions j + 1 to m can never be part of the optimal solution in any future
iteration and can be removed.
Proposition 4. Let yk be the dual value of the budget constraint in the optimal
solution obtained in the kth iteration of the column generation approach. yk is a
monotonically non-decreasing function with respect to ‘k’.




, where l is the last keyword allocated to some position j. In iteration k+1,
some new keyword i, with its corresponding columns, is part of the consideration






. Now using our LP optimal
algorithm to solve for optimality in iteration k + 1, we can have two options -
1. The last keyword assigned in iteration k + 1 before the budget runs out is
still l. This allocation will happen at position j (same as iteration k) or lower
as the amount of budget available to l in iteration k + 1 is now less than
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that available in k. Hence, according to our algorithm, it will be assigned to









, where j ≤ j.
2. The budget, based on our algorithm, gets exhausted before we reach keyword






, where new is the last keyword assigned to position j in







Proposition 5. If Ri1
Ci1
≤ y for some iεA, then the reduced cost for all j for the given
i will be less than or equal to zero.
Proof. Reduced cost for i at position j = RCij = Rij − yCij − λi. Now, RCij −






− y. But from our assumptions we know, Cij > Ci1 and





. Now, y ≥ Ri1
Ci1
.
Thus, y ≥ Rij−Ri1









, we have RCi1 ≤ 0 and
thus, RCij ≤ 0
Proposition 6. If the reduced cost of keyword ‘i’ (iεA) at position ‘j’ is positive,
then the reduced cost of the keyword ‘i’ at position 1 will also be positive.
Proof. The reduced cost at position j = Rij − yCij − λi, which is given as greater
than zero. For iεA, λi = 0. Thus,
Rij
Cij
> y. The reduced cost at position 1 for i is
RCi1 = Ri1 − yCi1. Thus, RCi1Ci1 =
Ri1
Ci1






;∀j > 1. Hence, RCi1 is positive.
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The column generation method for solving the advertiser’s problem would involve
the following approach - start by including a small set of keywords (randomly cho-
sen) and the respective relevant positions that these keywords could be bid to. Using
propositions (3) to (6), in each iteration we add a certain number of keywords and
respective columns from the set of keywords not under consideration. Also, we
remove certain keywords or a subset of columns for keywords under current consid-
eration based on the same set of propositions. Then using algorithm 2, we solve the
current set of columns to optimality and check for feasible entering keywords in the
next iteration. The algorithm terminates when no new keyword can be found to
enter the set of columns under consideration.
The column generation algorithm to solve the LP relaxation is as follows -
Algorithm 3 (LP Column Generation).
1. Select a set of keywords, A, and add corresponding columns at every posi-
tion such that the budget, B, will be completely used in the current optimal
solution. From the remaining set of keywords, A, for each keyword add the
column corresponding to the dummy position 0.
2. Solve the restricted LP master ⇒ Use the LP optimal algorithm described
earlier to solve the LP master to optimality. This will give us the optimal so-
lution to the current set of columns. Also, let the dual variables corresponding




, where l is the last keyword assigned to some position j before ex-
hausting the budget. Also, λi = Rij − Cijy, if xij = 1 and iεA in the current
optimal solution; otherwise λi = 0.
3. Remove the columns corresponding to iεA that follow proposition 3
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4. Discard all iεA that have Ri1
Ci1
< yk, where k is the current iteration (follows
from propositions 4 and 5).
5. To determine the entering keyword (and its associated columns), findmax{Ri1
Ci1
},
where iεA. Note - although this will be the entering keyword, we may not se-
lect the keyword corresponding to max{Rij
Cij
}, where j = 1..m and iεA
6. STOP if no column has positive reduced cost (or if within certain pre-determined
bounds). Else, GO TO step 2
Note that we need not calculate the convex hull of the keywords that will enter
the consideration set in an iteration. We just need to find the max{Rij
Cij
} for the
respective i to figure out the first relevant position on the convex hull. Solving the
LP relaxation using column generation approach may not terminate in an optimal
solution that is integral. We can, however, use the bounds obtained while solving
the restricted LP to solve for the IP.
The branching scheme that we propose would be on the original allocation variables
xij for the keyword i with fractional allocation between positions j and j + 1 i.e.,
the branching is of the form (A)
∑
k=j+1..m
xik = 0 and (B)
∑
k=j+1..m
xik = 1. A key point
to note is that our proposed branching scheme preserves the structure of the LP
column generation algorithm. Also to note is that points not on the convex hull can
be part of the optimal IP solution. For e.g., let us consider a bidder with a budget of
$2.5 and a single keyword to bid upon. Further, assume the bidder’s expected cost
and revenue at positions 1, 2 and 3 are ($3,$6), ($2,$1.5) and ($1,$1) respectively.
Position 2 does not lie on the convex hull. However, if we determine the optimal
solution to the integer program, the bidder would select position 2 (i.e., select a
point that is not on the convex hull).
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xik = 0 and (B)
∑
k=j+1..m
xik = 1. On branch (A), we need to find all
points not lying on the upper convex hull between xij and xi,j+1. Let there be p
such points. Note that xi,j+1 is not included in these p points. To apply our LP col-
umn generation procedure we need to compute (i.e., add to our existing points) the
upper convex hull starting at xij along with these p points and add the associated
variables. Also, delete the variables/ columns associated with the variables set to
zero on branch (A).
On branch (B), we necessarily spend at least Ci,j+1. Thus, we reduce the budget
by Ci,j+1 (i.e., B ← B −Ci,j+1 and solve the problem (using LP column generation
and sorting)) starting at point j + 1 on the upper convex hull. Notice that no new
points are added to the upper convex hull on branch (B).
3.5 Computational Results
We ran the LP, LP column generation and IP column generation on problems of
different sizes. Cost and revenue data was generated for each keyword-position
combination from a uniform distribution. Further, monotonicity in both cost and
revenue values was maintained with respect to position (i.e. the expected revenue
and cost at a higher position was higher than that of a lower one). The assumption
of monotonicity is in-line with the empirical results and observations in Feng et.al.
[FBP07]. For e.g. - for a given keyword, the cost and revenue at the lowest position
that we model for will be drawn from U[0,n]. Suppose the realization for cost is x.
Then, the cost for the next higher position will be drawn from U[x,x + n]. Rev-
enue values for each keyword-position combination are also generated by a similar
approach. Note that for large advertisers, a small subset of keywords contribute a
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large part of the revenue. The expected revenue for most keywords at the various
positions modeled for is negligible. However, in the revenue data we generated, the
revenue distribution was not skewed. Thus, from a computational standpoint, the
problem we solve is more difficult than the datasets in real-world.
The size of the problems that we ran the various algorithms on are typical of what
advertisers face in the sponsored search space. The largest advertisers in the spon-
sored search domain bid on tens of millions of keywords daily. However, the largest
keyword groups that share a common set of revenue metrics and budget targets
is of a smaller order. Based on keyword groups that share similar revenue objec-
tives, more than 99% of such keyword groupings have problem sizes from a few
hundred to about a few hundred thousand keywords. Thus, our results are rep-
resentative of the performance expectations that we can achieve solving real-world
sponsored search problems. We are unable to solve for small sized SEM problems
(e.g. 10,000 keywords at 30 positions) using OPL since the revenue and cost data
for each keyword-position combination has to be uploaded into memory at the same
time and thus, there doesn’t exist sufficient system memory to solve the problem.
The number of variables in the problem instances that we solved for range from
30,000 to 24 million. The corresponding number of constraints were between 1001
and 800,001. Table 3.1 indicates the size of the problems that we run our algorithms
against. Note that the column generation algorithms have an additional parameter
which provides the option of specifying the number of columns that can be added
in each iteration.
The results indicate the time to solve the problem optimally, averaged over five
problem instances. Further, the number of positions that we generated revenue and
cost data for each keyword was thirty. The algorithms were implemented on a 3 GB
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Table 3.1: Problem Dimension
Keywords Bid Levels # Variables # Constraints
1000 30 30,000 1001
10000 30 300,000 10001
50000 30 1.5 million 50001
100000 30 3 million 100001
250000 30 7.5 million 250001
500000 30 15 million 500001
800000 30 24 million 800001
Table 3.2: Computational Time for Algorithms (in secs)
Keywords Algo = LP LPCG B&P(multi) B&P(single)
1000 0.263 0.345 0.957 (10) 0.3567
10000 7.56 4.58 15.523 (10) 12.1
50000 171.02 46.94 143.5 (10) 218.16
100000 667.44 188.96 713.87 (20) 1029.75
250000 4041.44 1187.02 4628.72 (25) Unable to solve
500000 Unable to solve 7231.33 67020.21 (50) Unable to solve
800000 Unable to solve 31802.21 Unable to solve Unable to solve
RAM, 32 bit machine with a 3-GHZ Intel Pentium processor speed. The code was
implemented in Python on a Linux environment. The results are shown in Table 3.2.
The numbers in the bracket refer to the parameter that controls the number of
columns added in one iteration (i.e., number of columns added in each iteration <=
number of keywords/number of iterations).
The results in Table 3.2 indicate that we are able to solve for medium sized problems
(upto 250,000 keywords) using the LP approach. However, for larger problems, the
LP approach does not work since loading the parameters associated with all the
decision variables into RAM along with ordering the list of keyword-position tuples
by diminishing marginal values takes a long time. This occurs due to swapping of
data between RAM and the system hard disk since the RAM does not have sufficient
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space to accommodate all the data. In such instances, the LP column generation
approach can be used to determine the optimal solution. For the same system spec-
ification, we are able to solve for problem sizes that are at least three times larger
(800,000 keywords) than ones we can address using the LP technique. We have,
thus, demonstrated two approaches to solve the linear relaxation problem for prob-
lem sizes that are significantly larger than the ones that can be be solved by OPL.
We also demonstrate the use of the Branch & Price method to solve the IP formu-
lation for medium to large sized problems (100,000 to 500,000 keyword problems).
Again, we are able to solve for problem instances in the integer programming case
that are larger by an order of magnitude than the ones that can be solved by OPL.
In the advertising campaigns that are run by large online advertisers, no single key-
word contributes to a significant part of revenues or cost when measured across all
keywords. Since no more than one keyword can have a non-integral allocation in
the optimal solution to the LP relaxation of the original problem, we can follow a
randomization strategy to determine a feasible integral solution from the LP relax-
ation solution. We could pick one of the two positions with a certain probability for
the keyword with non-integral solution and have an integral solution. Due to the
relative insignificance of a single keyword for an advertiser, we would expect this
randomization strategy to arrive at an integral solution that gives us an expected
revenue very close to that of the IP optimal solution while ensuring that the spend
is close to the targeted budget. An example of a randomization strategy would be
to select position j with probability π and position j− 1 with a probability of 1−π
(refer to Step 5 in Algorithm 2 for the definition of π).
Advertisers may have hard budget constraints for a period of time (e.g., for a month
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or a quarter) but typically are willing to accept small variations in daily budget spent
on advertising. The randomization strategy that we propose could result in slight
overspend or underspend on a daily basis. However, we would not be, in expectation,
violating the hard budget constraint that is specified over the longer time period.
In case the advertiser has a hard budget constraint on a daily basis, instead of
randomizing over positions j − 1 and j for the keyword with fractional allocation,
we would just pick position j− 1 and not exceed the daily budget constraint. Thus,
we could use the LP column generation approach to produce near-integral solution
for very large problem instances and come up with an integral solution that is
close to optimal by either a randomization strategy on the keyword with fractional
allocation variables or with a deterministic approach when faced with a hard budget
constraint. We would be able to solve for problems larger in size than those that we
address using the Branch & Price framework.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have modeled the sponsored search problem from the adver-
tiser’s standpoint as a multiple choice knapsack problem and have shown that the
optimal solution will have no more than one keyword with a fractional allocation in
the optimal solution. Further, we develop a LP column generation approach and a
Branch & Price method to deal with the huge number of variables that medium to
large advertisers face.
The result show that it is possible to solve very large SEM problems using column
generation approaches on a single machine with modest specifications. Further, the
constraint structure of the problem, along with the fact that no single keyword con-
tributes to a significant portion of the revenue, supports using LP column generation
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to arrive at a very good approximation to the optimal integer solution. Thus, the
problem formulation and algorithms described in this paper can be used in a real
business context by advertising agencies, SEMs and large advertisers to successfully
come up with bids for the largest of campaigns that they manage.
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Chapter 4
A Benders Approach to Solve
Budget Constrained Auctions
Combinatorial auctions are an increasingly popular method used for allocation and
pricing in various business transactions. Over the last few years, availability of com-
putation power has resulted in the successful development of combinatorial auctions
in the fields of procurement, supply chain coordination, transportation services,
wireless bandwidth allocation and internet search. Although, the auctions have an
underlying budget constraint, nearly all the auction applications ignore this con-
straint to make the problem computationally tractable and have an allocation and
price that follows incentive compatibility. In this chapter, we consider the case of a
budget constrained auction and attempt to develop a method to provide a compu-
tationally efficient solution using the decomposible structure of the problem.
4.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters, we discussed an application of combinatorial auc-
tions to the sponsored search space. We further described computational issues and
economic properties that arise due to hard budget constraints, which need to be
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accounted for by the auctioneer as well as the bidders. Besides the sponsored search
space, combinatorial auctions have been an active area of research for applications
to domains such as supply chain planning and coordination, resource procurement,
allocating public goods like wireless spectrum auctions, treasury market, network
resource allocation and electricity pricing. Most of the academic literature as well
as real world implementations do not take the hard budget constraints faced by par-
ticipants into account. There is an implicit assumption that the participants have
some budget constraints, but it is typically assumed that the bidders have accounted
for these constraints in their bids. Thus, the auctioneer need not explicitly model
the budget constraint in the allocation and pricing problem that she seeks to solve.
Elmaghraby & Keskinocak [EK03] discuss the application of combinatorial auctions
to procurement of transportation services at Home Depot. The paper describes the
bidding mechanism developed at Home Depot to allow carriers to bid on various
lanes based on the network structure and demand at various nodes. The savings at
Home Depot by using combinatorial auctions is estimated to be in millions of dollars.
Bichler et. al.[BDHK06] provide details about the various features of a combina-
torial auction in an industrial procurement framework. It is estimated that nearly
40% of firms that spend more than $100 million a year use auction mechanisms
for procurement. Although it is difficult to obtain details about specific auctions in
use, due to the proprietary nature of various implementations, the paper provides an
insight into a combinatorial auction implementation at Mars,Inc. Caplice & Sheffi
[CS06] explore the usage of combinatorial auctions in the procurement of freight
transportation services. They discuss a winner determination problem with side
constraints that include business guarantee constraints. Ball et.al.[BDH06] provide
an application of combinatorial auctions to airport slot allocation.
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Many researchers in the computer science and operations research community have
addressed the computational issues related to combinatorial auctions. Lehmann
et.al. [LMS06] discusses the hardness of algorithms for winner determination and
details a search algorithm to solve the problem in a computationally efficient manner.
Leyton-Brown et.al.[LBNS06] perform tests to determine the empirical hardness of
the combinatorial auction problem. They create a test-suite to determine causes
of hardness in problems beyond just the increase in problem size. Bikhchandani
et.al. [BdVSV02] build on LP models to devise efficient implementations of the
VCG mechanism. They also provide a primal dual framework for understanding as-
cending auctions implementations in a multi-unit setting. Day & Raghavan [DR09]
define a compact, expressible language called matrix bidding to specify bids over
all possible item bundles and show that winner determination with matrix bids is
suitable for practical settings. Day & Raghavan [DR07] develop a constraint gen-
eration approach that determines allocation and prices in the core for the winner
determination problem. Their implementation converges to the core prices faster
than the clock proxy auction mechanism developed in Ausubel & Milgrom [AM02]
Most of the papers listed above, along with other work in the literature, typically
ignore computational issues arising from side constraints. Budget and other side
constraints are, however, an integral part of every auction and thus, need to be
modeled explicitly while solving the winner determination problem. Andelman &
Mansour [AM04] provide a model and approximate solution approach to deal with
the multi-unit allocation problem with budget constraints, when the bidder val-
uations are additive. In this chapter, we provide a method to solve the budget
constraint problem using the decomposible structure of the constraints. We provide
a solution approach using Benders decomposition and discuss heuristics to obtain
a good initial solution to start the iterative mechanism. Further, we provide a link
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between the Benders algorithm and an iterative auction implementation. We note
that in this chapter the assumption is that the auctioneer is interested in revenue
maximization.
4.2 Problem Definition and Model Formulation
The combinatorial auction that we consider in this chapter is as follows - an auction-
eer (seller) has n items to sell. There are m bidders and bidder i has a valuation Vij
for item j. We will assume that the bidder valuations are additive. In many settings
such as fantasy sports, internal resource allocation within a firm and other auctions
settings where complementarity between items is not evident, additive valuations
for items is a reasonable assumption. Thus, given the bidder valuations Vij for the
various items, the seller has to find an allocation and price for each item such that
her revenues are maximized. The seller, however, has to ensure that the bidders are
not charged beyond their budget limits.
Andelman & Mansour [AM04] studied the problem of finding a computationally
efficient solution to this budget constrained problem. They formulate the problem as
an Integer Program(IP) and develop an approximation algorithm using the solution
to the LP relaxation and applying a rounding method. The formulation that they










zij.Vij; for i = 1..m (4.3)∑
i=1..m
zij ≤ 1; for j = 1..n (4.4)
zij ∈ {0, 1}; for i = 1..m, j = 1..n (4.5)
Here, zij is a binary variable denoting whether item j has been allocated to bidder
i, pi is the price that the seller charges bidder i for the allocated items, Bi is the
budget of bidder i and Vij is the bid (i.e. the declared valuation) of bidder i for item
j.
Andelman & Mansour [AM04] show that the optimal allocation for an auction with
even two bidders and identical bids and budget constraints is NP-Hard by reduction
from the PARTITION problem. In fact, an exact optimal allocation can be found
for the budget constrained optimal allocation problem using dynamic programming
with time complexity of the order O(m4n). They further develop an approximation
algorithm for the problem by solving the LP relaxation of the above formulation
and assigning an item j to bidder i with probability zij. The approximation ratio
of the algorithm is shown to be 1.582.
However, it is hard to argue that participants in an auction would be satisfied with
an approximate solution. Further, in many public good auctions, participants would
like feedback on individual prices. The formulation of Andelman & Mansour [AM04]
gives allocation and price for the various bundles. It does not, however, give individ-
ual item prices as an output. Typically bidders would like feedback on the individual
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prices for the final allocation since the bids in this setting are submitted individually
on each item.
Our motivation is to find an exact allocation that maximizes revenue and also allows
for individual item prices. We now describe an Integer Program that will allow us
to determine individual item prices. Let Bi be the budget of bidder i and Vij be
the value that bidder i has for item j. The decision variables for the problem are
xij ∈ {0, 1}, the allocation of item j to bidder i and pij is the price that bidder i is










xij ≤ 1; for j = 1..n (4.7)∑
j=1..n
pijxij ≤ Bi; for i = 1..m (4.8)
pij ≤ Vijxij; for i = 1..m, j = 1..n (4.9)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, pij ≥ 0; for i = 1..m, j = 1..n (4.10)
The first constraint is the availability constraint (no item can be allocated to more
than one bidder), the second constraint specifies the budget constraint while the
third set of constraints correspond to the individual rationality (IR), with respect
to the bidder’s declared valuation. Individual rationality implies that the price of
an item allocated to any bidder cannot be greater than the bidder’s bid for that
item. The objective function as well as the constraint set (4.8) are non-linear. We
describe how to linearize and reformulate the above problem as a mixed integer
program (MIP). Let tij be the fraction of the budget of bidder i allocated to item j
and xij be a binary variable that determines allocation of item j to bidder i (xij = 1
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xij ≤ 1; for j = 1..n (4.12)∑
j=1..n
tij ≤ 1; for i = 1..m (4.13)
Bitij ≤ Vijxij; for i = 1..m, j = 1..n (4.14)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, tij ≥ 0; for i = 1..m, j = 1..n (4.15)
In the above formulation, the first constraint is the availability constraint, the second
constraint specifies that the sum of the fractions of the budget allocated to items
add up to to less than or equal to 1, while the third constraint is the individual
rationality constraint for each bidder-item combination.
When we attempt to solve instances of the above MIP formulation using OPL Studio
3.7 (which uses CPLEX to solve the MIP on a machine with 801 Mhz processor and
512 MB RAM), we observe that many instances can be solved very fast. However,
as the problem size increases, the solution time also increases. We also examined
the effect of the budget level on the running time. We observe that in certain
budget ranges, both the smaller and the larger problems take over an hour to run.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below show how the solution time varies with respect to the
budget level when the bids and budgets are drawn from a uniform distribution (10
instances each). Table 4.3 corresponds to runs when the bids are drawn from a
uniform distribution but the budgets are the same for all bidders.
From these three tables, it is evident that in certain budget ranges, the problem
takes a long time to solve. To try and solve these types of instances faster, we will
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Table 4.1: Time to IP optimal; 100 bidders, 100 items





U[0,30] abort (1 hr)
Table 4.2: Time to IP optimal; 100 bidders, 500 items
Budget Distribution Avg Time (sec)
U[0,500] 49.625
U[0,400] 47.953
U[0,100] abort (1 hr)
U[0,50] 295.31
U[0,25] 62.76
use the decomposible structure of the problem and apply Benders decomposition
method to potentially devise a computationally efficient solution method for the
problem.
Table 4.3: Time to IP optimal; 100 bidders, 100 items; Equal Budgets









4.3 A Benders Decomposition Approach to the
Budget Constrained Auction Problem
The Benders decomposition method separates out a mixed integer programming
problem into a integral master problem with a set of complicating constraints and a
set of linear sub-problems that can be solved independently. The procedure uses the
master problem to fix the integer variables and the sub-problems to find the value for
the continuous variables. Fixing the variables in the master problem helps us exploit
the special structure of the sub-problems and solve the sub-problems efficiently. The
sub-problem contributes a set of dual values that are used by the master problem
to generate a suitable cut in each iteration that the current solution to the mas-
ter problem violates. These constraints are also referred to as “Benders feasibility
cuts” since they enforce the conditions for feasibility of the master problem. This
process continues iteratively, with the master problem finding a new solution while
the sub-problems generate feasibility cuts, till we reach the optimality condition.
From the MIP formulation discussed in the previous section, we can see that if we
fix the values for xij in the problem, then the problem essentially decomposes into
a set of independent problems by bidder. We use this observation to develop our
Benders decomposition approach. The master problem that we seek to solve is an
allocation problem i.e. we solve the master problem, with the Benders’s feasibility
cuts, to determine the allocation of item j to bidder i. The sub-problem, on the
other hand, gives us the maximum willingness to pay by each bidder, for the given







xij ≤ 1; for j = 1..n (4.17)
Z ≤ Zmax (4.18)
(x, Z) ∈ F (4.19)
xij ∈ {0, 1}; for i = 1..m, j = 1..n (4.20)
Z is a scalar and the value for Z that we obtain in each iteration determines an
upper bound to the objective function of the original problem. F is the solution
space defined by the Benders feasibility cuts generated in all prior iterations using
the dual solution to the sub-problems in respective iterations. Thus, it is F that
defines the set of constraints that links the prices obtained from the sub-problems to
the allocation decision variables that are determined by solving the Benders master
problem. Zmax is a very large number that determines an initial upper bound. In
our case, we use the budget of the various bidders to determine an appropriate Zmax.
If we fix the allocation based on the solution to the master problem, then it is clear
that we have a separable problem structure; i.e., our sub-problems decompose by
bidder. Thus, each sub-problem can be interpreted as a bidder determining her
willingness to pay for each item allocated to her in any iteration, conditional on
her value for the individual items as well as the overall budget. The Benders sub
problem that each bidder i solves is -
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tij ≤ 1 (4.22)
Bi
Vij
tij ≤ xij; for j = 1..n (4.23)
tij ≥ 0; for j = 1..n (4.24)
The information exchange between the master problem (i.e. the auctioneer’s prob-
lem) and the sub-problems (i.e. the bidder’s problem) is shown in Figure 4.1. Here,
ωi is the dual variable corresponding to the first constraint in the formulation above
while λij is the dual for each of the constraints corresponding to second set.
The Benders decomposition algorithm for the budget-constrained auction problem
is as follows.
Algorithm 4 (Benders Decomposition Algorithm).
1. Set k = 0 (k is the iteration counter), Upper bound (UB0) = Zmax, Lower
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bound (LB0) = 0, Zmax = a very large number and F = {(X,Z)|X ∈
Bmn, Z ∈ R}.
2. While (UBk − LBk) > 0
(a) Set k ← k + 1





xij ≤ 1; for j = 1..n
LBk−1 ≤ Z ≤ UBk−1
(X,Z) ∈ F
xij ∈ {0, 1}; for i = 1..m, j = 1..n
(c) Set UBk ← Z
(d) Solve each of the sub-problems for the allocation x obtained above by
solving the master problem. Each bidder i solves the following problem
(which is the dual of bidder i′s sub-problem) -










ωi, λij ≥ 0; for j = 1..n
Let ωki , λ
k
ij denote the optimal solution obtained by solving bidder i
′s
problem in the kth iteration.














Note that in the first iteration of the master problem, none of the items will be
allocated to any bidder. Further, the algorithm will terminate when the upper
bound and lower bound are equal i.e. when we stop generating Benders feasibility
cuts since the necessary condition for primal feasibility would have been satisfied.
4.4 Accelerating Convergence of the Benders Al-
gorithm
In every iteration of the Benders algorithm, we essentially solve an integer program
while determining the allocation from the master problem solution. Thus, from
a computational standpoint, the solution time for the master problem effectively
determines the time taken to solve the entire problem. To address this issue of
convergence we can use the following strategies - generate a good initial solution,
formulate the problem such that the relaxation is tight and generate good cuts to
add to the master problem from the sub-problem duals.
When we apply the Benders decomposition algorithm to network optimization prob-
lems, it is very important to generate good cuts in each iteration, otherwise the
Benders algorithm converges very slowly. The budget constrained optimization
problem can be visualized as a bipartite graph assignment problem with additional
constraints. The bidders and the items form two disjoint group of nodes while the
allocation variable and the budget allocated from each bidder to every item can be
represented as links between these group of nodes. The additional constraint, in this
case the bidder level budget constraints, needs to be accounted for while solving the
bipartite graph assignment problem. It has been been found that problems where
the constraint matrix has a network flow structure, the problem typically has many
optimal solutions [MW81]. Given the network structure problem, we also observe
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that there is inherent degeneracy in the sub-problem optimal solutions. In our case,
if for a given master allocation, the optimal solution to the sub-problem hits the
budget constraint, then we have multiple prices for the allocated items that would
give the same revenue to the seller. For example, assume that a bidder is partici-
pating in a two-item auction with valuations of {$3,$3} for each item and a budget
of $5. If in any iteration, both items are allocated to this bidder, then the bidder’s
maximum willingness to pay for the package is $5. Individual prices {$2,$3} as well
as {$3,$2} both satisfy the budget constraint as well as the individual rationality
constraint. Hence, we will have a degenerate optimal solution for the sub-problem
corresponding to this bidder.
Magnanti & Wong [MW81] describe a procedure to generate “good” cuts from the
sub-problems in Benders decomposition. We use the following definitions from
their paper - a cut Z ≤ f(ω1) + xg(λ1) dominates the cut Z ≤ f(ω) + xg(λ),
if f(ω1) + xg(λ1) ≥ f(ω) + xg(λ) for all xεX with a strict inequality for at least
one point xεX, where X is the set of feasible allocations of items to the bidders in
our case. In the previous section, Algorithm 4 (point 2(f)) determines the nature
of Benders cut. Also, a cut is called a pareto optimal cut if it is not dominated by
any other cut. Associated with each cut is a dual set of variables from solving the
sub-problems. Thus, if a cut is pareto optimal then the associated dual variable is
also said to be pareto optimal.
To generate a pareto optimal cut for the budget constrained auction problem, we
use the following theorem from Magnanti & Wong [MW81] -
Theorem 3. Let x0 be a point in the relative interior of Xc, where Xc is the
convex hull of X. Also, let U(x̂) with x̂εX denote the set of optimal solutions to
the optimization problem Max(ω,λ)εU{f(ω) + x̂g(λ)} and let x0 solve the problem
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Max(ω,λ)εU(x̂){f(ω) + x0g(λ)}. Then x0 is pareto optimal.
In Algorithm 4, we can easily solve the minimization problem independently for
each bidder. However, like many other network optimization problems, the solution
to the sub-problems are degenerate in nature and thus, the solution method can
be accelerated by generating pareto-optimal cuts. Thus, in the step 2(f) of our
algorithm, instead of adding the cut specified, we want to add a pareto-optimal cut.




























If we solve the budget constrained problem as described in Algorithm 4, then the
initial optimal solution to the master problem could be that none of the items are
assigned to any bidder and the objective function of the master problem having a
value of Zmax, which initially is a very large number (at least as large as the sum of
all the bidder budgets). Instead, we could speed up the convergence to the optimal
solution for the original problem by using the bid data to find a “good” initial so-
lution. The two algorithms detailed below provide an initial allocation based on a
greedy approach.
Algorithm 5 below emulates a sequential auction process. In each iteration, the
item under consideration is auctioned off to the bidder who has the largest value,
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truncated by the remaining budget.
Algorithm 5 (Greedy 1).
1. Let j ← 0, Bremi ← Bi; ∀i (i = 1 to m) and xij ← 0;∀i, j (i = 1 to m, j = 1
to n)
2. j ← j + 1
3. For item j (items are selected in the order of their index in the data), find
i′ = argmaxi{min(Vij, Bremi )}. Set pj ← maxi{min(Vij, Bremi )} and xi′j ← 1.
Also, set Bremi′ ← (Bremi′ − pj). (In case there is a tie between bidders, then
randomly allocate selected item to any of the bidders in the tie set. Alternately,
one could allocate to the bidder with the highest remaining budget within the
tied set. If there is a tie between bidders with the highest remaining budget,
one could randomly allocate the items between the bidders that belong to the
tie set.)
4. If j < m then Go To Step 2; m is the number of bidders participating in the
auction.
5. STOP
In Algorithm 6, to find an initial solution, instead of considering items in the order
that they are indexed, we consider all items and the associated remaining budget
with the bidders to make an allocation. We choose to allocate the item that provides
the largest value, truncated by the remaining budget to the corresponding bidder.
Algorithm 6 (Greedy 2).
1. Let k ← 0, Bremi ← Bi; for i = 1..m and xij ← 0; for i = 1..m, j = 1..n
2. Find i′, j′ = argmaxi,j{min(Vij, Bremi )}. Set pj = {min(Vij′ , Bremi′ )}, xi′,j′ ← 1
and Bremi′ ← Bremi′ − pj.
73
3. Remove item j′ and associated bids for the item.
4. k ← k + 1
5. If k < n then Go To Step 2.
6. STOP
Let us consider an example where there are two bidders and three items being auc-
tioned of. Let bidder 1 have the valuations of $3, $5 and $2 for items 1, 2 and 3
respectively along with an overall budget constraint of $7. Similarly bidder 2 has
valuations $4, $3 and $6 respectively with a budget of $7. By algorithm ‘Greedy
1’, the items will be allocated as follows - Item 1 and 3 to bidder 2 at a price of $4
and $3 respectively and item 2 to bidder 1 at $5 for a total revenue of $12 for the
seller. In case of the ‘Greedy 2’ algorithm, items 1 and 2 are assigned to bidder 1
at $2 and $5 respectively while item 3 is assigned to bidder 2 at a price of $6. The
total revenue for the auctioneer is $13.
We compared the performance of the various formulations using OPL Studio 3.7,
running on machine with 512 MB RAM and an 801 MHz processor. The bidder
valuations for various items as well as the budgets were drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution. We ran the algorithms for the four different formulations - direct solution
using OPL’s MIP solver, standard Benders implementation (Algorithm 4), Benders
with initialization via the sequential item auction (Algorithm 5) and Benders with
initialization with the descending item valuation (Algorithm 6). Each value in Table
4.4 corresponds to an average over ten problem instances. Further, each (bidder,
item) problem was run for five different budget levels. The entries marked with a
(*) in the table indicate that the algorithm was terminated when the upper and
lower bound were within about 2.5% of each other.
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Table 4.4: Time to IP optimal (in secs) - Benders
Problem Size OPL(IP) Benders (default) Greedy1 Greedy2
2 bidders, 5 items 0.000 0.031 0.015 0.000
0.016 0.031 0.016 0.016
0.016 0.453 0.016 0.000
0.015 0.031 0.015 0.015
0.015 0.016 0.016 0.015
5 bidders, 10 items 0.454 10.432 7.272 4.927
0.078 11.276 4.475 11.65
0.156 17.609 18.686 19.624
0.516 22.131 6.662 8.96
0.093 13.809 14.767 15.615
10 bidders, 20 items 90.672 68.297* 615.6* 219.291*
1008.25 1315.97* 2503.82* 3277.14*
165.4 53.65* 426.66* 516.7*
397.594 393.2* 815.19* 752.87
0.453 11.124* 74.76* 55.29*
In Table 4.4, we can observe that although the Benders solution with the two
heuristics for initial allocation performs well for small problems, as the problem
size increases, the Benders implementation with the default starting solution per-
forms better. Hence, the applicability of the two initialization algorithms to the
budget-constrained problem is limited. Also, the time taken to solve the problem
instances to optimality using OPL Studio is significantly less than that using Ben-
ders. Although we could use the pareto optimal cuts as defined by Magnanti &
Wong [MW81] in a Benders decomposition framework, we do not expect to match
the performance of OPL due to the inherent degeneracy in the problem as well as the
significant gap in solution time between OPL and Benders variants, as seen in Table
4.4. The Benders approach, however, provides a nice framework to get feedback on
prices for interim allocations as well as provide a method to address the problem in
a decentralized manner. The next section details an auction interpretation to the
Benders framework.
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4.5 An Auction Interpretation to Benders De-
composition
In Benoit & Krishna [BK01], the authors show that when there are two items and
two bidders with a budget constraint, then if the items are auctioned of sequentially,
it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object first. The paper deals with the
case of common value items only. It also does not model cases when more than two
objects are present. We know of no study which models the case of the optimal
strategy from the sellers perspective when each bidder has individual valuations for
the various items. However, it is evident that the sequence in which items are auc-
tioned off will result in different revenues. Given that we do not know the bidder
valuations (i.e. they are private), we need to consider all items at a time and not
sequentially.
The Benders decomposition method described in this chapter can be considered as
an iterative auction mechanism with all items being considered in each iteration.
In every iteration, the solution to the master problem is an allocation of a subset
items to each bidder. The sub-problems take this allocation and return a set of dual
prices for either each allocated item (when the bidder’s budget is non-binding) or
for the set of allocated items and the bidder budget (when the bidder’s budget is a
binding constraint). The master problem can, thus, be interpreted as an auctioneer,
participating in an interactive format auction, who determines an allocation vector
in each round based on feedback that it receives from the bidders for the marginal
values of items & package of items allocated. Each sub-problem that we solve for
corresponds to a single bidder. The bidders, based on the current allocation, return
a set of marginal values to the auctioneer for the allocated item as well as the budget
constraint. Thus, the bidders in each iteration solve a pricing problem.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we model the multi-unit allocation problem with hard budget con-
straints and additive valuations. We show instances of the problem which are com-
putationally difficult and demonstrate the applicability of Benders decomposition to
the problem. The Benders approach provides an approach analogous to an iterative
auction model. With the current Benders implementation using OPL Studio 7.0,
there doesn’t seem to be a computational advantage over the standard MIP im-
plementation. However, the Benders method has a nice auction interpretation that
could be used in an iterative manner if bidders do not want to fully reveal valuations
over all items and the budget. Specifically in case of the MIP model, the bidders
would have to provide valuations for all the items while the Benders decomposition
approach would allow them to disclose values for only those items that have been
allocated in any iteration.
We could use the cut-generation method specified by Magnanti & Wong [MW81]
in a Benders decomposition framework. However, we do not expect it to perform
better than the OPL implementation since the problem is inherently degenerate and




Core Allocation for Budget
Constrained Auctions
Multi-unit budget constraint auctions are a popular form of resource allocation and
pricing in a variety of settings including procurement auctions, supply chain coor-
dination, search engine marketing and wireless spectrum allocation. The bidders
submit their valuations and budgets to the auctioneer, who aims to solve a social
surplus maximization problem with budget, allocation and individual rationality
constraints. The auctioneer seeks to determine an optimal allocation for items with
supporting prices that are in the “core”. FCC auctions for wireless spectrum allo-
cation and fantasy sports on the Internet are examples of real-world auctions where
the entity conducting the auction aims to maximize social value. These problems
can be solved using the ascending proxy auction algorithm proposed by Ausubel &
Milgrom (2002). However, their approach suffers from convergence problems, lack
of feedback on individual item prices, and capping of bidder valuations at budget
over an exponential set of packages. In this chapter, we develop a constraint gener-
ation procedure for a setting where the bidder valuations for the items are additive.
The problem is modeled as a mixed integer program (MIP) with an exponential
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number of constraints and we develop an approach to determine core allocation and
individual item prices directly using the toolkit of integer programming. We, fur-
ther, extend this approach to model the core determination problem for a general
combinatorial auction (i.e., where the bidder valuations are not additive).
5.1 Introduction
The last few years has seen tremendous growth in auctions being used for resource
allocation and pricing across a range of business domains. Increased computational
ability has resulted in combinatorial auctions being developed for a range of ap-
plications that include procurement, supply chain coordination, wireless spectrum
allocation, airport slot distribution, real-time electricity markets, communication
network pricing and search engine marketing. The academic community has ac-
tively contributed to theoretical advancements as well as in developing practical
models to address these domains. Even with a fairly restrictive set of assumptions,
solving combinatorial auctions to optimality remains a non-trivial computational
task. Hence, most academic works ignore the presence of real constraints that all
the bidders face e.g. a hard budget constraint.
Ideally, we would like the auction mechanism to have properties like efficiency, in-
centive compatibility and individual rationality, amongst others. The presence of
budget constraints not only makes the problem computationally more difficult, it
also destroys some of the economic properties of the unconstrained version of the
auction. In the case of auctions with unconstrained bidders, the VCG mechanism
gives an incentive compatible allocation and associated prices. However, one of
the underlying assumptions of the VCG mechanism is the quasi-linearity of bidder
utility. If we have a hard budget constraint, then this assumption is violated as
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the bidder has a utility of −∞ when the budget constraint is exceeded. One can
easily show by a counter-example that the VCG mechanism applied to a budget
constrained auction is not incentive compatible.
Borgs et.al. [BCI+05] consider a multi-unit auction having multiple agents with
private valuation and hard budget constraints. They show that there is no truth-
ful auction that satisfies the properties of consumer sovereignty, independence of
irrelevant alternatives and strong non-bundling. They, then, develop a randomized
approach to determine an asymptotically optimal auction (the objective is revenue
maximization for the seller). However, their work does not determine if there exists
any deterministic allocation method that is incentive compatible, under the presence
of budget constraints.
In Benoit & Krishna [BK01], the authors show that when there are two items and
two bidders with a budget constraint, then if the items are auctioned of sequentially,
it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object first. The paper deals with the
case of common value items only and also, does not model cases when more than
two objects are present. We know of no study which models the case of optimal
strategy from the sellers perspective when each bidder has individual valuations for
the various items. However, it is evident that the sequence in which one auctions
of the items will result in different revenues for the auctioneer. Thus, we need to
consider all items at a time and not sequentially. Che & Gale [YG00] consider the
selling of a single item and discuss a non-linear pricing approach for optimal allo-
cation in the presence of budget constraints. Pai & Vohra [PV08] consider hard
budget constraints in a single unit auction. They derive revenue maximization auc-
tions for the above setting and show that subsidizing participants with low budgets
is never desirable from the auctioneer’s standpoint. Dobzinski et.al. [DLN08] prove
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an impossibility result that states that there does not exist any mechanism in the
case of multi-unit auctions that is both incentive compatible and pareto-optimal,
when the budgets are privately known.
Given the lack of a mechanism for incentive compatibility under budgetary con-
straints, we consider a weaker economic criterion, namely a social welfare maximiz-
ing allocation and a set of individual item prices that are in the core. A core is
defined as the set of feasible allocations that cannot be improved upon by a subset
or coalition of the participants taking part in the allocation mechanism. The prob-
lem that we consider is to determine a core allocation and supporting prices while
maximizing social welfare. Social welfare maximization arises in a number of real
as well as virtual settings. In the case of many public asset auctions, the objective
of the government is to maximize the social surplus. For resource allocation within
various departments in a firm, the central authority that takes decisions based on
the departmental budgets, aims to allocate resources to maximize social value within
the firm. Fantasy sports is an increasingly popular activity in which the platform
provider too is interested in overall value maximization. The following sections for-
mulate the core allocation and pricing problem, under budget constraints, using the
toolkit of integer programming. We show how to model the core with an expo-
nential set of constraints. Rather than including these core constraints explicitly,
we use a constraint generation approach identical to Day & Raghavan [DR07]. We
show how to use this constraint generation approach to determine the social welfare
maximizing core allocation and prices simultaneously.
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5.2 Core Allocation for Budget Constrained Auc-
tion
The auction that we consider in this chapter is the following - an auctioneer (seller)
has n items to sell and there are m bidders bidding for the various items. Each
bidder has a certain valuation for each of the items and has her own overall bud-
get limit (assumed to be a hard constraint). As discussed in the previous section,
solving to optimality a budget constraint auction, even with additive valuation, is
computationally hard. Further, in many real-world settings like fantasy sports or
resource allocation within a firm, the valuations are additive. Thus, we initially
assume that the bidder valuations are additive. Given the bidder valuations for
the various items, the auction operator has to find an allocation and price for each
item such that the overall social welfare is maximized. Further, the operator has to
ensure that the bidders are not charged beyond their budget limits.
Let Bi be the budget of bidder i and Vij be the value that bidder i has for item j. To
prevent bidders from declaring arbitrarily large valuations, we limit the value of a
single item by the budget (i.e., Vij ≤ Bi). The decision variables for the problem are
xij ∈ {0, 1}, the allocation of item j to bidder i and pj, which is the price observed
by all bidders for item j. Further, let us assume that there are m bidders and n
items. The operator aims to maximize the social surplus. The formulation below











xij ≤ 1; for j = 1..n (5.2)∑
j=1..n




Vijxij; for j = 1..n (5.4)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, pj ≥ 0; for i = 1..m, j = 1..n (5.5)
Equation (5.2) is the availability constraint (no item can be allocated to more than
one bidder), equation (5.3) specifies the budget constraint while equation (5.4) cor-
responds to individual rationality (IR), with respect to the bidder’s declared valua-
tions. Note that in the above formulation equation (5.3) is non-linear.
In the above formulation, we could have an optimal solution with all the pj’s






Vijxij i.e. it is independent of pj. Also, none of the constraints ne-
cessitate that pj be strictly greater than zero. Now, if the auctioneer declares the
optimal allocation obtained above and the prices of items as zero to the bidders,
then each bidder can increase her overall surplus by bidding incrementally more
than zero for various items not allocated to her, without violating her own budget
constraint. Thus, the losing bidders for each of the items are willing to pay more
than zero to the auctioneer to increase their surplus. The seller, too, would be
willing to consider such bids and change the current allocation as she can increase
the revenue generated from the auction. Hence, the allocation and prices obtained
by solving the above formulation is not stable as it provides motivation for both
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the seller as well as the bidders to collaborate and deviate from the same. For a
stable allocation, the formulation has to include a set of constraints such that no
coalition of bidders and seller has an incentive to deviate from the allocation at
the determined prices (i.e., allocation and prices consistent with our prior informal
definition of the core). When the solution is in the core, effectively the surplus from
the current allocation and prices observed by each bidder should be greater than
the surplus generated from all other possible allocations, at the current set of prices.
A novel auction mechanism used for multi-unit allocation is the Ausubel & Milgrom
[AM02] ascending auction. If there are no budget constraints, then the Ausubel
& Milgrom auction avoids many of the problems associated with the VCG mecha-
nism. Limitations of the VCG mechanism include low revenues for the auctioneer,
decreasing revenues as bidders are added to the auction or if bidders change their
bids, and collusion being a profitable strategy for the participants.
Let T be an outcome of a combinatorial auction i.e. T corresponds to a set of
allocations and payments for the bidders. Also, let the coalition CT refer to the set
of bidders receiving items under the outcome T . To help understand the method to
determine a core allocation and prices for an auction under budget constraint, we
will use the following definitions from Day & Raghavan [DR07] -
1. An outcome T is considered blocked if there exists an alternative outcome TB
that generates more revenue for the seller and for which each bidder in CTB
weakly prefers to T . CTB is referred to as a blocking coalition
2. An outcome that is not blocked is called a core outcome.
The Ausubel & Milgrom[AM02] ascending proxy auction works roughly as follows.
The bidders report their values for the various packages that they are interested
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in to the proxy. The bidders could also specify their overall budget constraint to
the proxy agent. In every iteration, the auctioneer specifies a set of prices for the
various packages. The proxy agent for a bidder takes these prices and figures out
the package that will maximize the bidder’s surplus, at the current price levels. The
agent then bids for that package in the auction. In every iteration the auctioneer
determines the revenue maximizing allocation and the prices for the over-demanded
packages are increased incrementally. The auction terminates when there are no
new bids from the proxy agents. It is important to note that all the intermediate
bids are kept live throughout the auction. Ausubel & Milgrom [AM02] prove the
following theorem -
Theorem 4. The payoff vector π resulting from the proxy auction is a core impu-
tation relative to the reported preferences: π ∈ Core(L,w). Here, L is the set of
players (includes seller) while w(S) is the value of coalition S.
Due to convergence to the core, the seller gets competitive revenues while the buyer
allocation is efficient. Also, to note is that in every round of the auction the objec-
tive function being maximized is the seller revenues and the overall buyer surplus
i.e. in every iteration, social welfare is being maximized. An issue with the Ausubel
& Milgrom (AM) auction is convergence. Since, in each iteration prices are changed
by a very small amount, the auction is plagued by a slow convergence to the core.
The AM auction can be modified to solve core allocation problems with budget
constraints. The modification proposed is to put a cap on the bidder valuation for
a subset of items at the bidder specified budget. E.g.- if a bidder has a valuation of
$5 for item 1, $4 for item 2 and a budget of $7, then the bidder valuation is assumed
to be $5 for item 1, $4 for item 2 and $7 for items 1 & 2. However, this modification
creates two issues - artificial capping of bidder valuations that makes the auctioneer
85
ignore true item valuations of the respective bidders and a pre-processing step to the
actual algorithm that necessitates determining valuations over an exponential set of
packages. Continuing with the example above, let us assume that there is a second
bidder that values item 1 and item 2 at $7 but has no value for each individual
item. The budget for bidder 2 is assumed to be $7 (same as bidder 1). Based on the
approach in the AM paper for budget constraints, the auctioneer in this case would
assume that both the bidders have the same valuation for the package containing
items 1 & 2, although bidder 1 has declared a strictly higher valuation. If the auc-
tioneer had a choice between allocating both items to either bidder 1 or bidder 2,
the valuation capping approach would make the auctioneer indifferent between the
two bidders. The auctioneer could have achieved higher efficiency by allocating both
items to bidder 1.
An argument that has been sometimes made is that if the bidder really values a
subset of items higher than the budget, then she should be specifying a higher will-
ingness to pay. However, in the real-world, valuations and budgets don’t necessarily
go together. E.g. a telecommunications service provider may value two cities in the
US at $2 billion and $1 billion respectively. The valuation is calculated based on
business potential that the firm estimates for each city. The budget, however, is
determined by the ability of the firm to raise funds from various stakeholders and
thus, is limited by factors that include financial market conditions and the firm’s
past performance. Thus, the bidder may be able to raise no more than $2.5 billion
for the auction.
To understand the issue with the pre-processing step prior to running the AM auc-
tion, let us assume there are 50 items being auctioned off and that the bidders have
additive valuations over this set of items. We will have to determine the value of
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each subset of items where the value of a subset is the sum of values for the indi-
vidual items in the subset, if the sum is less than the budget. If the total value of
the items in the subset exceeds the budget, then the value is capped at the bidder’s
budget. With 50 items, we will have to evaluate nearly 1015 bundles. Hence, even
if we assume that truncation of values at budget is acceptable, we cannot use the
AM algorithm to solve a package auction of this size.
Further, the AM ascending auction mechanism fails to provide feedback on indi-
vidual item prices, even when the valuation is additive and is specified for each
individual item by the bidder.
Although the work of Day & Raghavan [DR07] and Hoffman et.al. [HMvdHW06]
discuss implementations for faster convergence to the core, both the papers ignore
budget constraints. The allocation is the efficient allocation for the given bids and
the core prices are calculated for this allocation. Further, Day & Raghavan [DR07]
show that it is a Nash equilibrium to bid truthfully. However, in the case of budget
constrained auction, the core allocations need not be the social welfare maximizing
allocation obtained by ignoring budget constraints; and thus, we have to determine
both the allocation and prices simultaneously that satisfy the various constraints. In
the following section, we formulate the pricing and allocation problem with core con-
straints as a mixed-integer program. We demonstrate that for the additive valuation
case, we can determine the core allocation and prices, if they exist, by a constraint
generation approach. In fact, our approach is able to solve the core allocation and
pricing problem under budget constraints with individual item price feedback. We,
also, give examples of budget constrained auctions under additive valuation that
will not have a core solution with individual item prices. In such cases, we can use
our proposed method with a modification that has package prices instead of item
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prices.
5.3 Core Problem Formulation as a MIP
Borgs et.al. [BCI+05] describe the lack of any deterministic incentive compatible
mechanism currently known for budget constrained auctions. In the case of auc-
tions run by public sector organizations like the FCC as well as in the case of
combinatorial exchanges jointly operated by bidders and sellers, the objective of
the entity running the auction is to maximize the social welfare. Similar situations
of social welfare maximization is also found in online environments dealing with
“funny money” e.g. fantasy sports. In this section, we formulate the social welfare
maximization problem as an integer program. The auction operator is trying to
maximize social surplus for all the participants concerned. In the formulation of
Andelman & Mansour [AM04], they considered the problem from the auctioneer’s
standpoint i.e. the auctioneer is interested in revenue maximization. Thus, the opti-
mal solution obtained would be such that, after the bids and budgets are submitted,
the auctioneer would have no incentive to deviate from the determined allocation
and prices since the objective function was revenue maximization for the auctioneer.
Instead, let us assume that the auctioneer and bidders both have agreed to an
exchange that they believe is “fair”. The auction operator doesn’t favor either
party but is interested in obtaining an allocation and corresponding set of non-
discriminatory prices that all participants accept and don’t have an incentive to
deviate from. Thus, we seek to determine an allocation and set of prices that are
in the core; i.e., given the bids and budgets, there will be no losing bidders that
could have bid more than the current set of prices paid by the winners, given their
declared bids and budgets. Note that in the analysis below, the item valuations for
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all bidders are assumed to be additive.
The following example will clarify the need and motivation for the core formulation
described later in the chapter. Let us consider a seller auctioning off two items A
and B. Also, assume that there are two bidders participating in the auction. Bidder
1 values each item at $5 and has an overall budget of $7. Bidder 2 values the two
items at $4 each and has an identical budget constraint as bidder 1. If the auctioneer
is interested in revenue maximization, then we can use the model described in the
previous chapter or that in Andelman & Mansour [AM04] to determine the optimal
allocation and associated prices. In the revenue maximization case, item A will be
allocated to bidder 1 at $5 and item B will be allocated to bidder 2 at $4. The total
revenue that the seller receives is $9. Further, there is no other feasible allocation
that is individually rational to the bidders and will result in higher revenues to the
seller. Hence, the seller has no incentive to collaborate with any bidder and change
allocation or prices. The allocation is, thus, in the core.
Let us now consider the case where the auctioneer is performing social welfare max-
imization instead of revenue maximization. Under social value maximization, both
items A and B will be allocated to bidder 1, at a combined price of $7, since the
budget constraint cannot be violated. Assume that the prices declared are $3.5
and $3.5 respectively. Bidder 2, who is currently getting zero surplus as she is not
assigned any item, can increase her surplus by bidding $3.5 + δ on item B. Also, the
seller can increase her revenue from $7 to $7 + δ by accepting the offer of bidder
2. Thus, the price and allocation determined by solving the social welfare maxi-
mization problem is not stable, unlike that for the revenue maximization solution
considered previously.
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If instead bidder 1 is allocated item A and bidder 2 is allocated item B, one should
note that the prices $3.5 and $3.5 (for items A and B respectively) are in the core,
since neither bidder can bid more on the respective losing items without violating
one’s own budget constraint. Also, to note is that there are other prices that support
the core allocation. For example, the same allocation as above along with prices of
$3.5 and $4 for the respective items is also in the core. However, this core point is
not bidder-pareto optimal. An outcome is defined as bidder-pareto optimal if there
is no other outcome in the core weakly preferred by every bidder in CT (Day &
Raghavan [DR07]). However, it be clear that bidder 2 prefers being assigned item
B at a price of $3.5 rather than $4. In the formulation that we describe later in the
chapter, we formulate the problem to determine the core solution and discuss an
approach by which our formulation can be modified suitably to determine a bidder-
pareto optimal outcome.
Let pj be the price of item j and xij ∈ {0, 1} indicates if item j is allocated to bidder
i. Let us assume that the value (in our case, the bid) of item j to bidder i is Vij
and the budget for bidder i is Bi. The problem that the auction operator solves to
determine the core allocation and prices for a budget constraint auction with additive
















xij ≤ 1; for j = 1..n (5.7)∑
j=1..n




Vijxij; for j = 1..n (5.9)∑
j=1..n







for i = 1..m, S ⊆ J (5.10)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, pj ≥ 0; for i = 1..m, j = 1..n (5.11)
The objective function consists of two parts - the first part corresponds to the seller
revenue while the second is the total buyer surplus. The seller is interested in
maximizing her own revenues while each bidders wants to maximize her respective
surplus. For an allocation and price to be in the core, the surplus to any bidder
for the current allocation and prices should be at least as large as that generated
by any subset of items at the current price level. This is not a requirement of the
core definition in Day & Raghavan [DR07] but we can determine a set of supporting
Walrasian equilibrium item prices by incorporating equation (5.10) in our model. In
fact, the equilibrium item prices will be a subset of the core supporting price vec-
tor. Equations (5.7), (5.8) and (5.9) are identical to equations (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4)
respectively. The constraint set (5.10) has the following interpretation - the surplus
from the allocation at the current price levels is higher than the surplus generated
by any other allocation, where the price paid for any allocation is capped at the
declared bidder budget. The chosen subsets of J do not violate the bidder’s budget
constraint; i.e., if the sum of the individual prices is higher than the bidder’s budget,
then the payment for the items is assumed to be capped at the declared budget.
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These additional constraints result in an exponential number of constraints being
added to the social welfare maximization problem defined by equations (5.6)-(5.9).
Also, one should note that constraints (5.8) and (5.10) are non-linear.
We linearize equations (5.6)-(5.11) by introducing the variable tij, where tij is the
fraction of the budget of bidder i allocated to item j. A MIP corresponding to










xij ≤ 1; for j = 1..n (5.13)∑
j=1..n
tij ≤ 1; for i = 1..m (5.14)



















(Vij)−Bi; for i = 1..m, S ⊆ J (5.18)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, tij ≥ 0; for i = 1..m, j = 1..n (5.19)
Constraint (5.13) is the item allocation constraint. Constraint (5.14) dictates the
fractional budgetary allocations for a bidder will not exceed one. Constraint (5.15)
indicates that no part of a bidder’s budget will be allocated to an item, unless that
item is assigned to the bidder. The individual rationality for the allocated items
is ensured by constraint (5.16). Constraints (5.17) and (5.18) together define the
core constraints, where the payments for the current allocation are capped by the
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bidder’s budget.
Note that we can modify the objective function (5.12) to obtain a bidder-pareto core
solution rather than any general solution in the core. The new objective function to



















Bitij) in the objective function, the value maximizing core solution will
correspond to a set of prices from the bidders that maximize the difference between
the first and second terms in the new objective function. This can be re-interpreted
as a value maximizing core solution where the second term in the new objective
function is minimized. The second term is nothing but the sum of prices paid by
the bidders multiplied by a constant, α. Hence, this formulation results in an optimal
core allocation that is supported by a set of prices such that the sum of the prices
for the items is minimized. In the next section, we describe a constraint generation
approach to deal with the exponential number of constraints in a computationally
efficient manner.
5.4 Constraint Generation Approach to Determine
Core
The core allocation and pricing problem for the budget constrained auction problem
can be solved by the ascending proxy auction of Ausubel & Milgrom [AM02]. The
AM auction makes a strong assumption that the bidder valuations for packages are
capped at the respective budgets. Further, the auction suffers from multiple issues
- slow rate of convergence, the core solution being dependent on the step size for
incrementing the price on over-demanded items, lack of feedback on individual item
prices in case of additive valuation and the need to evaluate package valuations on
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all possible packages, even when the valuations are additive. If we directly solve
the formulation described in the previous section, we avoid the limitations of the
Ausubel & Milgrom auction. However, in our case, the core is defined by an ex-
ponential number of constraints and thus, we need to determine an approach that
addresses associated computational issues.
We can characterize the core allocation and price as follows - if the current prices and
allocation are in the core, then no bidder can increase her own surplus by bidding
more than the current winner on any item not allocated to her without violating
her declared budget constraint. To deal with the exponential number of constraints
that define this core, we seek to separate out the set of core defining constraints
that don’t have any effect on the optimal solution from those that define the opti-
mal allocation and prices. We use an approach identical to that in Day & Raghavan
[DR07] to generate appropriate constraints to define core. In their work, the authors
consider a standard multi-unit auction with no budget constraint. Thus, they start
of with an efficient allocation for the stated valuations and then determine a set
of supporting prices that are in the core. However, in case of budget constrained
auctions, it is not necessarily the case that the allocation that maximizes value will
be a core allocation. Thus, we determine both the core allocation and prices simul-
taneously.
We start with solving the linearized version of equations (5.1)-(5.5), i.e. equations
(5.12)-(5.16). If the prices and allocations do not violate any of the core constraints
(i.e. equations (5.17) or (5.18)), then we have arrived at a core point. However, to
verify whether a core constraint is being violated for a bidder, we need to compare
the surplus at current price levels with an exponential subset of item groups. In
other words, we need to check the surplus at the current price levels for each bidder
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over all possible set of items, S, where S ⊆ J (here, J denotes the set of all packages
that can be created from n items). We show how this can be achieved by solving the
separation problem SEP (i), described below, to find the most violated constraint
corresponding to equation (5.17) for a bidder i. If the objective function for SEP (i)
has a value less than or equal to zero, then no core constraint is being violated for
the bidder at the current allocation and price levels. However, if the objective value
is greater than zero, then we need to find the set of items that result in the constraint
being violated. The price of these items cannot exceed the bidder’s budget. If the
price exceeds the budget, we add constraint (5.18) instead, since the right side of
constraint (5.18) is now greater than that for (5.17). Steps 4 and 5 in Algorithm
6 provide the details to find the most violated constraint for a given bidder, at a


















Bitij)yj ≤ Bi (5.21)
yj ∈ {0, 1};∀j = 1..n (5.22)
Note that xij and tij are given for problem SEP (i). Also, let Z
i
SEP denote the value
of the objective function for the problem SEP (i). Solving the separation problem
is essentially solving a knapsack problem for every bidder to determine the most vi-
olated constraint. For each bidder, we determine the most violated constraint, add
it to the formulation comprising equations (5.12)-(5.16) (including the constraints
added in all previous iterations) and resolve the problem. The stopping criterion for
this algorithm is when we can find no Walrasian equilibrium prices that are being
violated by current allocation. Algorithm 7 describes in detail the solution approach.
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Algorithm 7 (Algorithm to find Core).











xij ≤ 1;∀j = 1..n∑
j=1..n
tij ≤ 1;∀i = 1..m






(x, t) ∈ F
Denote the optimal solution by (x̄, t̄)




Solve SEP (i) and denote by y∗j the optimal solution to SEP (i)
if Zisep > 0
Si = {j|y∗j = 1}













if Pass(i) = 1 for each i
DONE
else
Go To Step 2
An important point of note is that the a core allocation and supporting set of in-
dividual item prices (i.e. Walrasian equilibrium prices) may not exist for certain
bidder valuations and budgets. The algorithm that we described above finds the
core with individual item prices, if it exists. In case, there is no such supporting
set of prices, then the algorithm detects infeasibility and will terminate without de-
termining the core. In such a case, we can use the constraint generation approach
similar to that described in Algorithm 7 to find a core allocation with supporting
package prices. We will need to modify step 2 in Algorithm 7 to add constraints that
account for multiple allocated packages not having the same items (we will describe
this procedure in section 5.6).
The following example demonstrates a two bidder case where a core allocation with
individual item prices does not exist. Let us assume that there are four items that
the bidders declare their valuation for. Bidder 1’s valuation for the items is {19,
5, 18, 18} while bidder 2 has a valuation of {19, 16, 18, 17}. Further, the two
bidders have a budget of $21 and $22 respectively. In the first iteration, items 1,
2 and 3 will be allocated to bidder 2 while item 4 will be assigned to bidder 1.
Each item will be be priced at zero. At the current set of prices and allocation, the
most violated constraint for both bidders would involve all the four items. Thus,
the most violated constraint for the bidders will be 19x11 + 5x12 + 18x13 + 18x14 ≥
60−22(t21+t22+t23+t24) and 19x21+16x22+18x23+17x24 ≥ 70−21(t11+t12+t13+t14)
respectively.
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Note that the left hand side of both these constraints has to be greater than 38
and 49 respectively, irrespective of what allocation and prices we arrive at. This
is, however, not possible since it requires that at least three of the xij’s for each
bidder equate to 1. Thus, there is no feasible allocation that can support these two
constraints.
An issue which we have not addressed in this chapter is the incentive of the bidders
to declare bids or budgets that deviate from their true values. Borgs et.al. [BCI+05]
describe the lack of any known incentive compatible mechanism for the multi-unit
auction setting with budget constraints. As there are no known incentive compat-
ible mechanisms, we focused on determining core allocation and associated prices
assuming that the bidders have correctly stated their values for individual items and
overall budget. However, the bidders could shade their bids or budgets and increase
their surplus.
To limit the ability of bidders to substantially shade their values or budgets, we
require that the budget stated by a bidder has to be greater than the maximum
value that the bidder has for any individual item. This ensures that bidders who,
for example, state very high bids for individual items cannot shade their budgets
significantly and still be allocated items by the auctioneer. In fact, by shading the
budget, the bidder will be reducing the possible number of items that the auction-
eer considers for allocation to the bidder. Thus, in the presence of competition, the
bidder negatively affects her own probability of winning items from which she could
have derived a positive utility, if she had stated her true budget. However, if there
only a few bidders participating in the auction, the bidders may have an incentive
to shade their budgets.
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An alternate approach to determine a core solution would be to use the simultaneous
ascending auction described by Cramton [Cra06]. Simultaneous ascending auctions
are ideally suited for settings where the complementarities between the individual
items is weak. All the items are auctioned off simultaneously and the bidders have
the flexibility to bid on any set of items. The auction terminates when none of the
bidders raise the bid on any of the items being auctioned off. In the additive valua-
tion case, the simultaneous ascending auction does not have any exposure problems
since there are no complementarities between the items. Also, the auction provides
the bidders an opportunity to discover item prices over multiple rounds. A key
advantage of this auction format is its simplicity.
The simultaneous ascending auction format converges to a core allocation when the
individual items are substitutes, bidders are price takers and the bid increments in
each auction round are infinitesimally small. In the additive setting that we have
described so far only one of the conditions i.e., items being substitutes, holds true.
In the computational experiments that we describe in the next section, we have
cases where the competition is limited and thus, bidders are not price takers. In
practice, bid increments ranging from 5 to 20% are used. An advantage of the si-
multaneous ascending auction is that the bidders do not have to state their budget
to the auctioneer. In fact, a variant of this format called the clock auction precludes
the bidders from declaring their bids to the auctioneer (the bidders only express the
desired quantities at the price denoted by the clocks associated with each item). In
the clock auction format the bidders which items they are still bidding for in each
round. A limitation of the clock auction is that under budget constraints current
prices of item A can affect the decision to bid for item B. For e.g., assume a bidder
has valuations of $5 each for items A and B and a budget constraint of $8. If the
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current prices for each of the items goes over $4, then the bidder will stop bidding
for one of the two items. Our model does not face this issue.
Three key issues with using the simultaneous ascending auction format are demand
reduction, collusive bidding and convergence issues related to small bid increments.
In case of limited bidder competition, the auctioneer revenues as well as auction
efficiency can be significantly affected due to bid shading by bidders with higher
valuations [Cra06]. Collusion between bidders in FCC auctions has also been ob-
served in practice. The auctioneer can modify the auction rules to reduce collusion
and encourage competition. Cramton [Cra06] suggests methods that include con-
cealing bidder identities, setting high reserve prices and offering preference for small
businesses. The core allocation approach that we have proposed has incentive is-
sues similar to that observed in simultaneous ascending auctions. However, like the
simultaneous ascending auctions, incentive issues are of less concern to us if there is
substantial bidder competition. Our method, in fact, addresses a key issue related
to auction convergence faced in the simultaneous auction setting since our final al-
location and prices are based on a one-time set of inputs from bidders regarding
their individual item values and overall budget. Further, our model considers all
possible core solutions while the choice of bid increments prevents the ascending
auction format from doing so.
5.5 Computational Experiments
We ran the core allocation and price determination algorithm for the additive val-
uation case. The algorithm was run on various problem instances where we varied
three parameters - the number of bidders, the number of items being auctioned off
and the bidder budgets. The bidder valuations for each item were assumed to be
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drawn from a uniform distribution, U [0, k]. The bidder budgets were also drawn
from a uniform distribution. The budget for a bidder is a value drawn from the
distribution U [k, k + p]. Here, p is a parameter that we will vary to observe the
computation time as a function of the bidder budget. We specify four levels for p
where level 1 corresponds to the highest budget level and level 4 is the lowest budget
level (i.e. tightest budget constraint). Also, the value for p at each budget level is
half the value of p at the previous budget level. For example, if level 1 corresponds
to a budget drawn from U [k, k + p] then budgets for bidders corresponding to level
2 will be drawn from U [k, k + (p/2)]. The values for p were selected from the list
[kn, kn/2, kn/4, kn/8], where k is the number used above in the uniform distribution
and n is the number of items being auctioned off.
The algorithm was run using GLPK 4.43 & libraries that allow calls to the GLPK
routine using Python. We used PyGLPK and PyMathProg to write the algorithm
in Python and make appropriate calls to GLPK solver. The code was run on a 1
GB RAM, 1 GHz Intel Centrino machine with Linux OS. The results are shown in
Table 5.1.
Note that the entry NFCS stands for the problem instances where we found ‘No Fea-
sible Core Solution’. Each cell in the table indicates the average computation time
across ten problem instances. The results indicate that our method can determine
the existence of core solution as well as core allocation and prices in a reasonable
time frame. Further, we observe that tighter budget constraints typically result in
higher computation time, for a given problem size.
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Table 5.1: Computation Time for Core Allocation & Prices (Algorithm 7) (in secs)
Budget Level
Bidders Items 1 2 3 4
2 2 0.0281 0.0305 0.0398 0.0485
5 0.4038 0.9050 1.0256 1.1350
10 1.7846 5.0212 5.9336 9.8690
5 2 0.0630 0.0844 0.0868 0.0776
5 0.7063 1.0289 0.9680 0.8325
10 7.5686 8.3460 8.4360 NFCS
10 2 0.2034 0.3124 0.2720 0.3361
5 2.2700 2.1900 1.4396 1.9960
10 13.661 14.4236 16.2740 16.6422
20 2 0.8764 0.9340 1.0332 1.1093
5 4.8166 5.5278 4.8360 6.4280
10 27.6780 28.2726 31.3874 32.7579
50 2 3.484 4.9486 3.915 4.0079
5 22.746 26.655 28.556 32.6245
10 115.306 122.24 133.578 238.25
5.6 Core Formulation for General Package Auc-
tions
In this section, we generalize the core pricing and allocation problem for a combi-
natorial auction where no assumptions are made on the bidder valuations (i.e., the
bidder valuations need not be additive). Similar to the approach in Section 5.4, we
develop a non-linear formulation to define the core and then reformulate it as a MIP.
Let i be the bidder index varying from 1 to m and j be the item index varying from
1 to n. Also, let N be the set of all packages that can be created from the items
and S denote a specific package. Note that the auctioneer has a single copy of each
item and the bidders use the OR bidding language to express their preferences over
the packages. A bidder can be allocated more than one package and the budget
of a bidder has to be greater than the bidder’s maximum value over any package
102
that the bidder is interested in. We specify this requirement on the bidder budget
so that the there is a lower bound on how much the bidder can shade her budget.
Further, for any bidder that shades the budget a lot, lesser number of packages will
be considered by the auctioneer for possible allocation to her. Thus, the bidder
will have to take this trade-off between budget shading and lower probability of
being allocated various packages into consideration. The inputs to the optimization
problem are Vi(S) and Bi, where Vi(S) is the value (bid) of bidder i for package S
and Bi is the budget declared by bidder i. The decision variables for the problem
are p(S), the price of package S and yi(S) ∈ {0, 1}, where yi(S) is 1 if the bidder i
is allocated package S and is zero otherwise. A bidder can be allocated any number
of packages that she bids on. The core allocation and pricing problem for a general





















yi(S));∀S ⊆ N (5.26)∑
S⊆N
p(S)yi(S) ≤ Bi; for i = 1..m (5.27)∑
S⊆N







for i = 1..m (5.28)
yi(S) ∈ {0, 1}, p(S) ≥ 0; for i = 1..m,∀S ⊆ N (5.29)
The objective function is maximizing social surplus. Constraint(5.24) and (5.25) are
feasible allocation constraints. Constraint (5.24) indicates that no package can be
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allocated to more than one bidder and (5.25) corresponds to feasibility of items over
the allocated set of packages. Constraint (5.26) corresponds to the set of individual
rationality constraints with respect to the declared bidder valuations. The constant
M is a very large value and we can use the maximum bids and budgets disclosed by
the bidders to arrive at an appropriate value for M . We use the big M method in
constraint (5.26) because we do not want unallocated packages to have their price
constrained i.e., unallocated packages need not have zero core prices. The budget
constraint for each bidder is imposed by constraint set (5.27). Constraint (5.28)
defines the core and specifies that the surplus generated by the allocated package to
the bidder at a price p(S) is at least as large as the surplus generated by any other
package at the current set of prices. Note that the constraint sets (5.27) and (5.28)
are of a non-linear nature.
To linearize the above formulation, we define a variable ti(S), where ti(S) is the
fraction of bidder i′s budget used for obtaining the package S. The MIP formulation




















Vi(S)yi(S);∀S ⊆ N (5.33)



















yi(S));∀S ⊆ N (5.37)∑
S⊆N




Biti(S);∀S ⊆ N (5.39)
yi(S) ∈ {0, 1}, p(S) ≥ 0, ti(S) ≥ 0; for i = 1..m,∀S ⊆ N (5.40)
We will use a constraint generation approach to specify the core constraints. Hence,
we solve for equations (5.30)-(5.34) and (5.37)-(5.40) and check if the optimal al-
location and price violate any of the constraints specified by (5.35) or (5.36). If
none of the constraints are being violated, then we have determined the optimal
core allocation and package prices. If, however, any of the constraints in (5.35) or
(5.36) are being violated, then we need to determine the most violated one for each


















Bi.ti(S))x(S) ≤ Bi (5.42)
x(S) ∈ {0, 1};∀S ⊆ N (5.43)
If the value for equation (5.41) is greater than zero, then the Ŝ for which x(Ŝ) = 1
is the package corresponding to the most violated constraint for the specific bidder.
Thus, we need to add the constraint
∑
S⊆M




to (5.30)-(5.34) and (5.37)-(5.40), and resolve the problem.
From a computational perspective, the amount of computation required to find the
most violated constraint in each iteration is equivalent to finding the package which
gives the maximum surplus to a bidder in any iteration of the Ausubel-Milgrom
auction. However, since our solution is not dependent on any step size for the item
prices, unlike the Ausubel & Milgrom auction, we consider all possible core points
and will not face convergence issues related to the choice of step size. Thus, from
a practical standpoint, our constraint generation approach can be applied to any
combinatorial auction problem where the Ausubel & Milgrom ascending auction is
thought of as a feasible format.
A few researchers have proposed that in the case of package auctions a budget
constrained core allocation can be obtained by a minor modification to the Ausubel
& Milgrom [AM02] algorithm or the method proposed by Day & Raghavan [DR07].
The modification that the researchers propose is to truncate the valuations at the
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bidder budget for each package that the bidders are interested in. The core allocation
algorithms are run on these packages with truncated values. It is, thus, assumed
that the increased computational complexity of the approach described earlier in this
section is not warranted. In section 5.2, we showed an example where there exists
an optimal allocation that does not maximize social welfare when we truncate at
bidder budgets and apply the AM algorithm. This occurs due to the information
loss that is inherent when the valuations are truncated. The method that we propose
always takes the true valuation (assuming bidders bid truthfully) of the bidders into
account and thus, would determine the allocation within core that maximizes social
welfare, i.e., an efficiency maximizing allocation within the core.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have demonstrated a MIP based approach to determine individual
item level core allocation and prices under hard budget constraints, when the bid-
der valuations are additive. We provide a computational approach that maintains
allocation feasibility throughout. This is unlike the Ausubel & Milgrom auction,
where none of the interim allocations are feasible. Also, we provide an approach to
deal with the practical impediments in choosing appropriate step size for the same.
Further, we describe a method to determine the bidder-pareto optimal outcome by
refining the core determination formulation.
We extend this approach to combinatorial auctions with general bidder valuations
and show that finding violated constraints in each iteration is computationally equiv-
alent to finding the maximum surplus package determination by the Ausubel &
Milgrom ascending auction. We have run computational tests to provide support
for practical implementations of such an IP based approach in the case of an ad-
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ditive valuation setting. We believe that this chapter addresses some unanswered
research questions for core determination in a budget constrained setting and rep-
resents a first attempt to define a framework and demonstrate an implementation




In this thesis, we have attempted to model budget constrained combinatorial auc-
tions in the context of sponsored search and other multi-unit allocation settings.
The last decade has seen an explosive growth in application of auction theory to
resource allocation problems in many online as well as offline settings. Practical ap-
plications have included online advertising, supply chain coordination, procurement
auctions, airport slot allocation, wireless spectrum allocation and fantasy sports.
Researchers from diverse fields such as computer science, economics and operations
research have contributed significantly to literature that examines economic proper-
ties and computational issues of these auction formats. An issue that has received
very limited attention from the research community is the presence of hard bud-
get constraints. Hard budget constraints introduce a non-linearity effect in bidder
valuations, which results in mechanisms like the VCG losing their economic prop-
erties. Further, the presence of budget constraints makes the resource allocation
and pricing problem significantly more difficult from a computational standpoint as
compared to algorithms for the unconstrained case. We provide various frameworks
to address multi-unit, budget constrained auctions from the perspective of the auc-
tioneer as well as the bidders.
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Auction mechanisms have become the de-facto standard for pricing and allocation
of ad space for many online advertising channels. The significant growth in rev-
enues that has occurred for firms such as Google, Yahoo and Facebook over the
last few years can be mostly attributed to the application of auctions to online ad-
vertising. Auctions are prevalent across online advertising channels such as search
engine marketing, graphical display ads, social media ads, contextual text ads and
mobile advertising. These online advertising channels have the channel operator
(e.g. Google, Yahoo etc.) creating a platform for advertisers to set bids for various
biddable units and budgets for campaigns, while the channel operator solves an al-
location and pricing problem with the bidder inputs. Currently, these mechanisms
account for more than $30 billion dollars of advertising spend online. The significant
economic value, the pervasive use of these auctions and the lack of research address-
ing computational implications of budget constraints in these auctions motivated us
to address in this thesis the following research questions.
1. Search engine platforms currently use generalized second price (GSP) auctions
for pricing and allocation. The GSP auction is not incentive compatible. Can
we formulate the auction problem in the incentive compatible VCG framework
and use optimization methods to solve optimally in real time typical problem
sizes that the search engine operators face? Further, can we enhance the
expressiveness of the auction for the bidders and still solve the auction in real
time?
2. The large advertisers bid on hundreds of thousands of keywords on a daily
basis and have hard budget constraints to deal with. Are there computational
methods that can help advertisers determine optimal bids to place on the
various advertising channels when dealing with tens of millions of decision
variables?
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3. The auctioneer is typically interested in revenue maximization. In case of
bidders with hard budget constraints and additive valuations over items, can
we use the decomposible constraint structure of the revenue maximization
problem to efficiently solve the problem to optimality?
4. When the auctioneer is aiming to achieve social value maximization and the
bidders have hard budget constraints along with additive valuations over items,
are there computational methods to help the auctioneer arrive at an optimal
allocation and price vector (specifically individual prices for items) such that
neither the auctioneer nor any of the bidders have an incentive to deviate from
the optimal solution? Further, can we extend our methodology to address
general package auctions?
Chapter 2 attempts to address research question 1 posed above. Instead of specify-
ing a single bid for a keyword, the auction format we consider provides the bidders
the ability to express different bids for various ad slots. Here, the allocation and
pricing problem faced by the auctioneer is formulated as an assignment problem.
Using the Hungarian algorithm for assignment problem, we demonstrate how the
auctioneer can solve the allocation and pricing problem in real time, even with
this increased expressiveness. Consequently, this also provides VCG prices for the
auction. We also extend the model to solve for the option of allocating multiple,
contiguous slots to advertisers (which is appropriate for graphical ads). Currently,
Facebook uses a VCG mechanism for its biddable advertising marketplace [Heg10].
Advertisers bid to place ads for specific targets (e.g., age range, likes & interests,
geo etc.) and Facebook uses a VCG mechanism to determine allocation and pricing.
Our approach provides an algorithm that can determine the optimal solution for
their auction in polynomial time.
In chapter 3, we formulate the problem that budget constrained advertisers face
111
while attempting to determine optimal bids for each keyword of interest. We for-
mulate the problem as an integer program and show that the linear relaxation to
the problem has a “near-integral” property. We use column generation approach
to solve the linear relaxation to optimality for large scale problems (problems that
involve upto 24 million decision variables). Further, we demonstrate the application
of a branch and price algorithm to solve for the IP formulation. To our knowledge,
this is the first time that such methods have been applied to solve large-scale bid
determination problems in online advertising from the bidder’s perspective. Chap-
ter 3, thus, addresses research question 2.
To address research question 3, we use a MIP formulation to determine optimal
prices and allocation for a revenue maximization auctioneer objective and additive
bidder valuations with hard budget constraints. Chapter 4 uses the Benders decom-
position framework to recast the MIP formulation as an iterative auction mechanism.
Although the Benders formulation does not provide any improvement over the OPL
results (OPL is a commercial software to solve MIPs), it does provide a framework
to arrive at the optimal solution with limited information revelation by the bidders.
Chapter 5 deals with the determination of a core solution for a social welfare maxi-
mizing auctioneer with the bidders having hard budget constraints. Chapter 5 seeks
to address research question 4. First we deal with the case when bidder valuations
are assumed to be additive. In this case, we use a constraint generation method iden-
tical to that in Day & Raghavan [DR07] to arrive at a core solution. However, our
model has to incorporate the budget constraints and thus, we develop a method to
determine core prices and allocation simultaneously. Further, our method provides
individual item prices for the additive case. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first time that core solution determination for budget constrained auctions with
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individual item price feedback has been addressed algorithmically in the research
community. We, also, extend our approach to demonstrate how general package
auctions with budget constraints can be formulated as MIPs and extend the use of
the constraint generation technique to determine core prices and allocation.
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